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Essentially, success or failure of collective action depends on two sets of factors.  
First are the characteristics of the people concerned, such as the size of the group 
they are forming, the extent of their heterogeneity, and the social capital at their 
disposal understood as their tradition of cooperation in other areas than the one 
considered.  Heterogeneity may result from a variety of sources, such as 
differences in exit opportunities, in time horizons, in resource uses or techniques 
adopted to exploit them, in skill levels or capital endowments, etc.  Second we 
find the characteristics of the technical, economic, and political environment that 
bear upon the enforcement costs of a collective scheme.  Technical aspects may 
refer to the physical attributes of a common-pool resource such as its location, 
its degree of compactness, the frequency and predictability of its produce flows, 
etc. ; or to the features of the technique used to extract these flows, or to build up 
a public good.  Among economic aspects, let us mention in particular the market 
conditions prevailing for inputs and outputs involved in the collective activity 
concerned.  Finally, political aspects mainly refer to the role played by state 
institutions, either impeding or supporting local-level collective initiatives. 
  Collective management of fish resources can be considered as especially 
difficult to achieve given their problematic characteristics  : fish moves over 
widely spread areas, appears with low levels of predictability, is caught by a 
large variety of harvesting techniques, etc [see Baland and Platteau, 1996  : 
Chap. 10].  The fact that during the 1990s several important fishing communities 
along the Senegalese coastline have adopted effort-restraining schemes on their 
own initiative deserves all the more attention as such attempts are a rare 
occurrence in fisheries.  There are four central questions that need to be 
investigated :  
 
(i)  Have these schemes been motivated by market power or by 
resource management considerations ?  Indeed, by colluding with 
the purpose of limiting supply, fishermen may want to exercise 
market power so as to cause a rise in fish prices.  Alternatively, they 
may desire to stop the dissipation of the resource rent and the 
depletion of the resource stock by putting an end to an open-access 
mode of operation. 
(ii)  Are the schemes effectively run and have they proven to be 
sustainable ? 
(iii)  What types of fishermen do appear to be most convinced or most 
supportive of effort-limiting measures  ; and is it possible to 
understand the characteristics of supportive fishermen in the light of 
available economic theory ? 
(iv)  What are the reasons behind the varying incidence of success of 
such measures in different points of the Senegalese coastline and 
regarding different techniques or species of fish ?   3
 
The analytical framework used throughout most of this study is directly inspired 
from transaction-cost economics, implying that a lot of attention is devoted to 
monitoring and enforcement costs involved in collective schemes.  One of its 
most important contributions is to show that, with the help of these tools 
combined with conventional market power considerations, successes and 
failures of different groups of fishermen according to their technique and site of 
operation can be well accounted for.  
The outline is as follows.  In Section 1, background informations 
regarding Senegalese small-scale maritime fisheries are provided and the 
methodology of the study based on cross-section data is shortly described.  In 
Section 2, an historical sketch of all recent effort-limiting schemes attempted 
along the Senegalese coast is presented, thus complementing the background 
informations given in the preceding section.  Moreover, the methods used to 
limit fishing efforts, which vary according to the fishery concerned, are 
discussed with a view to understanding their rationales in the light of the specific 
circumstances surrounding them.  In Section 3, question (ii) above is addressed 
by looking at the incidence of rule violations as perceived by the fishermen 
themselves.  Question (i) is also probed into by considering fishermen’s 
statements and, for a reason to be explained at that stage, by relating these 
statements to their perceptions about rule-breaking.  Finally, question (iii) is 
tackled by using the multinomial logit approach on the basis of our survey data.  
Section 4 is specifically devoted to question (iv) which is (partly) elucidated by 
fitting a time-series econometric model to price and output data.  Section 5 
summarises the main results of the study.  
 
     
1.  The context and methodology of the study  
 
Background information about Senegalese maritime fisheries  
 
Fishing forms a vital sector of the Senegalese economy, particularly because, 
with oilseeds, fish is the most important export item, bringing valuable foreign 
exchange to the country.  About 50,000 artisanal fishermen work in this sector 
with perhaps three times as many people engaged in fish processing and 
marketing in the informal part of the fish economy (there are 10,000 fishermen 
operating in the industrial sector). While the small-scale fishing subsector 
accounts for more than 60% of the landings destined for export markets (and 
processed by specialised export companies), its share in total fish output exceeds 
75%
1.  Almost 85 percent of artisanal fishermen operate in three areas —the 
                                                           
1 Note that the fish caught by foreign industrial vessels in the Senegalese waters and disposed 
of in foreign ports (rather than in Dakar) is not recorded.  There is thus clearly an upward bias   4
Grande Côte (comprising Kayar and Saint-Louis), the Petite Côte (comprising 
Mbour and Joal), and the Cap Vert (corresponding to the Dakar area)— which 
are precisely those covered by our study.  It is interesting to note that the capital 
stock of the small-scale fishing sector has increased rapidly during the last 
decade : thus, the number of pirogues operating in the different sites of artisanal 
fishing has increased by as much as 42 percent between 1994 and 1997.   
Although smaller than the average, the expansion of the artisanal fishing fleet in 
the most important ports remains quite impressive: 33 percent in the Cap Vert 
area, 31 percent in the Grande Côte, and 8 percent in the Petite Côte (CRODT, 
1998 : Table 38 ; CRODT and DOPM, 1998 : Table 11).   
  Given such a rapid increase of the fishing capital stock, it is not surprising 
that there has been growing pressure on fish resources, particularly on bottom-
dwelling species living in coastal waters which are considered to be 
overexploited (Barry-Gérard, Kebe, and Thiam, 1992  ; Barry-Gerard, 
Fonteneau, and Diouf, 1992).  As for coastal pelagic species, biologists of the 
Centre de Recherche Oceanographique de Dakar-Thiaroye (CRODT) believe 
that they are rapidly nearing optimum exploitation.  Witness to this rising 
pressure is the adaptive tendency of small-scale fishermen to adopt mixed gears 
and to go to more distant fishing sites (a strategy that has been made possible by 
the introduction of so-called ‘pirogues glacières’, that is, pirogues equipped with 
ice boxes made of expanded polysthyrene in which fish can be stocked and 
preserved for several consecutive days), but also the increasing incidence of 
conflicts between fishermen’s groups using different harvesting techniques and 
the growing tensions between artisanal and industrial operators.  Public 
authorities are increasingly aware of the threat on fish resources as evidenced by 
the fact that the notion of ‘biological rest’ has been recently introduced in the 
fishing agreement struck with the European Community for the period 1997-
2001.  Yet, this provision (which entitles the government of Senegal to prohibit 
the harvesting of any species considered to be over-exploited) is  likely to be of 
little avail in so far as European vessels do not seem to be any more attracted to 
the Senegalese waters due to lack of profitability : thus, only one-third of the 
quota earmarked for European vessels within the framework of the 1994-1996 
agreement has been actually used by them (Parlement Européen, Direction 
Générale des Etudes, 1996 : 121).  
  The fact of the matter is that the artisanal fishing sector has undergone 
rapid transformation during the last decades, particularly under the impact of 
significant technical innovations, including the shift from cotton to nylon nets, 
the motorisation of traditional pirogues (and their adjustment to permit the fixing 
of an outboard engine), the introduction of large purse seines capable of 
collecting large schools of pelagic fishes, the fitting of ice boxes to the pirogues 
designed for hook-and-line fishing, etc.  As a result, the productivity of boats 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
in the estimate of the contribution of the small-scale sector to total fish output and, above all, 
to total fish exports.     5
and fishing gears in the small-scale sector has increased enormously, 
compounding the effect of their sheer multiplication on fish landings. 
 
  
Methodological considerations  
 
Fieldwork has taken place in two steps.  First, a rapid appraisal of 
important fishing sites in the Petite Côte, the Grande Côte and the Cap Vert area 
has been undertaken with a view to identifying possible schemes of effort 
control.  Hann, Mbour, Joal, Mouette, Tassinaire, Pilote Bar, Kayar, Saint-Louis, 
Yoff, and Soumbedioune have thus been visited between May and October 
1996.  In the last four sites only, evidence has been found of past or present 
genuine experimentation with such schemes.  Among the dominant centres of 
artisanal fishing in Senegal, Mbour, Joal, and Hann therefore stand out as places 
where no organisation has been set up to limit fish landings while Kayar, Saint-
Louis, and Soumbedioune appear, on the contrary, to have attempted to create 
arrangements of this kind (Yoff is a port of lesser importance).  Second, in these 
sites where regulatory schemes have been tried, we have opted for in-depth 
inquiries on the basis of household questionnaires addressed both to fishermen 
and fishmerchants.  The purpose was essentially to determine the level of 
support of these schemes among the fishermen as well as to examine whether 
some categories are more supportive than others and why.  To answer those 
questions, econometric methods specially designed to deal with qualitative 
variables are amply resorted to using stata software.  Note that, in addition to 
sites where attempts at limiting catches have been made, we have selected a 
fishing village where no regulation has ever taken place (Hann near Dakar).  
This is with the hope of understanding the reasons underlying the absence of 
regulatory measures.  Also bear in mind that not all fisheries in the successful 
ports targetted for this study have been brought under a regulatory scheme, 
thereby adding observations which we can use to detect circumstances adverse 
to effort limitation.  The household survey was conducted during the year 1997 
(between April and July). 
The stratified random sampling method has been applied so as to have 
adequate representation of different fishing techniques in use in each site as well 
as to distinguish between owners and crew within each technique and, when the 
need   arises, between residents and immigrants within the owners’ stratum.   
(Bear in mind that many crew labourers come from outside the fishing site, even 
from the rural hinterland, particularly in the purse seine fishery where unskilled 
and inexperienced fishermen are more easily accommodated provided that they 
are suitably supervised by a core group of expert crew).  It is with the assistance 
of agents of the fishing department, of enumerators working for the CRODT, of 
local knowledgeable people (such as the ‘notables de quartier’), and of persons 
bearing responsibilities in fishermen’s organisations or in local associations of   6
various types (such as mosque committees) that we have been able to properly 
define the criteria for sample stratification in each fishing site.  In Table 1 are 
given the characteristics of the sample for each of the five aforementioned 
fishing sites.   
Random selection of households within each subsample was made by 
choosing a central physical point in the fishing site and letting enumerators 
move in different directions and pick up every house out of a fixed number 
(which varied according to the site concerned) until the predetermined size of 
each subsample was eventually reached (the so-called random walk technique).  
Unfortunately, difficulties in meeting household heads for a long enough time to 
have the questionnaire filled up were much more serious than foreseen, as a 
consequence of which the actual sample size was significantly smaller than 
initially envisaged.  Reduction of sample is especially noticeable with respect to 
crew labourers due not only to pressure on their limited time available for 
leisurely talks during the fishing season but also to reluctance of their owner-
employer to let them speak outside their control.  Eventually, crew labourers 
came to form about half the total sample of 320 households whom we could 
interview in good conditions
2. 
 
Table 1  : The structure of the sample as per fishing site, technique and 
ownership status 




Beach seine  Total 
  own crew  own crew own crew own crew own crew own crew
Kayar  19*  17  15°  12  - -  11°° 6 - -  45  35 
Saint-Louis  19 21 14  8 - -  10  7 - -  43  36 
Soumbedio. -  -  13 12 11 14  -  -  -  -  24 26 
Yoff 11**  11  10 14  1 0 - - 5  10  27  35 
Hann  7  8  6  8  10 10  -  -  -  -  23 26 
Total  56 57 58 54 22 24 21 13  5  10  162  158 
* Among whom are 11 residents, 6 immigrants native of Saint-Louis and 2 immigrants from Fass Boye. 
** Among whom 7 are residents and 4 are immigrants from Saint-Louis. 
° Among whom 8 are residents and 7 are from Saint-Louis. 
°° All of them are actually native of Saint-Louis. 
 
We have pointed out above that the site of Hann has not known any 
decentralised scheme of effort control.  It must be added now that experience of 
such schemes has been short-lived in Soumbedioune, thus making the latter site 
closer to Hann than to Kayar, Saint-Louis, and Yoff from the standpoint of effort 
regulation.  Moreover, as pointed out above, not all fisheries in the last three 
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eventual sample of crew labourers fishing with lines is only 8 people instead of the 15 initially 
scheduled.  The worst case is that of crew operating bottom-set nets in the same site (7 
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sites have been subject to limitations of some sort.  While in Kayar purse seines 
and lines are regulated (bottom-set nets are subject to loosely applied access 
rules), this is true only of purse seines in Saint-Louis and of lines in Yoff (and 
Soumbedioune).  In other words, the available sample contains data about 
attitudes of two categories of fishermen, those who have gone through a 
(sustained) experience of effort control and those who have not.   Adopting a 
restrictive definition of what constitutes a regulatory experience, we count 127 
fishermen in the former category –corresponding to the sum total of owners and 
crew labourers operating purse seines in Kayar and Saint-Louis or lines (without 
ice) in Kayar and Yoff (see the figures in bold characters in Table 1)– and 193 
fishermen in the latter.  If a broader definition is retained, so that practitioners of 
line fishing in Soumbedioune are considered as having experienced regulation in 
spite of its short-lived character, the division of sample fishermen between the 
two above categories is according to the ratio 152-168 instead of 127-193.  
Opinions of local fishmerchants regarding regulatory schemes have been 
solicited in various sites.  The sample comprises 20 fishmerchants from Kayar, 
13 from Saint-Louis, 20 from Yoff, and 20 from Hann.  Results of these 
interviews have been disappointing and will therefore not be commented upon in 
this study.  
 
 
2.  Collective management of sea resources in Senegalese coastal 
communities 
 
A brief  historical sketch of effort-limiting schemes 
 
The first attempt by small-scale fishermen to regulate their harvesting efforts has 
been made in 1992 in the village of Kayar.  Interestingly, this initiative has been 
launched by the Comité de solidarité Kayar-Guet Ndar which the fishermen 
established in 1990 with the support of some outstanding public authorities 
(such as the governors of Saint-Louis and Thies, and the General Khalife of the 
Muslim brotherhood of the Layènes in Yoff) in order to bring to an end the bitter 
conflicts that opposed resident fishermen from Kayar to immigrant fishermen 
from Saint-Louis.  In the wake of this emerging collective action movement 
encompassing fishermen of all origins, it was decided that canoes equipped with 
purse seines would be allowed to make a single trip per day during the season 
suitable for this type of fishing.  A special committee named comité des sennes 
tournantes (committee for purse seines) has been created towards the purpose of 
enforcing the above rule which was apparently motivated by the desire to 
increase producer prices for the pelagic species targeted by purse seines and to 
reduce the market power wielded by local fishmerchants (known as mareyeurs 
in Senegal).  The scheme has persisted to this date.   8
  Two years after the creation of the comité des sennes tournantes, the so-
called comité des pêches (committee of the fisheries) has been set up by the 
fishermen of Kayar to extend the experience of purse seines to the domain of 
line fishing which targets demersal species destined for export markets.  This 
step was taken soon after the devaluation of the CFA when fishermen started 
fearing a severe contraction of their profit margins owing to a rapid rise of their 
production costs (especially, the costs of fuel and the prices of imported fishing 
equipments).  Output prices did not rise significantly either because the species 
concerned were not of an exportable variety or because fish intermediaries 
succeeded in preempting a large share of the gains from devaluation.   
The existence of the latter phenomenon was actually confirmed in the 
course of interviews conducted with some management staff of fish-processing 
factories in Dakar.  According to them, indeed, commission agents in charge of 
purchasing raw fish on the landing sites on behalf of export companies did not 
hesitate to collude with the purpose of preventing producer’s prices from 
increasing after devaluation.  The system of payment applied by these 
companies actually encouraged trade malpractices since they used to pay a 
predetermined price per unit weight (based on world market prices) to their 
commission agents, leaving them free to appropriate any residual gain obtained 
by underpaying fishermen.    In other words, fishmerchants were able to deprive 
fishermen of the beneficial effects of devaluation.  It is in reaction to this glaring 
manipulation of market prices that the fishermen started to demonstrate, first in 
Yoff (near Dakar) and soon thereafter in Kayar where the protest movement 
took on the form of a strike stretching over three consecutive days during which 
fishmerchants were starved of fish.  Fishermen of Kayar demanded prices five to 
ten times higher than those offered them by the mareyeurs !   
Given that merchants refused to raise their prices substantially after 
fishermen went back fishing, the latter decided to sell the fish themselves to the 
factories by renting in refrigerated vans and transporting the raw produce to 
Dakar.  This was nevertheless a temporary solution soon succeeded by a 
systematic attempt to limit catches of demersal species through the fixing of a 
maximum number of boxes of fish that a canoe is allowed to unload on the 
beach for disposal.  Most of the time, the number of boxes is set at three, yet the 
comité des pêches can increase or decrease the quota depending on prevailing 
demand and supply conditions.  In actual practice, the quota per canoe never 
falls below two boxes of fish because fishermen consider that line fishing cannot 
be profitable if catches are smaller than this quantity.  Yet, when catch limitation 
prove insufficient to prevent an abrupt fall in fish prices, the bureau of the 
comité des pêches (composed of a president, three vice-presidents, one secretary 
general and his two associates, plus a president in charge of a subcommittee 
dealing specifically with problems of fish marketing) organises a joint meeting 
with the fishmerchants’ representatives in order to determine a floor price for the 
day.     9
The scheme was still in force at the time of writing, attesting to its 
viability compared with lock-out movements –which are unsustainable given the 
lack of intertemporal markets to smoothen temporary disruptions of economic 
activity– and with direct sales of fish to export companies –which confront 
fishermen with considerable costs due to their lack of experience and skills in 
marketing. 
Migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis operating in Kayar during part of the 
year have played a critical role in diffusing in their native area the institutional 
innovation adopted by purse seine operators in Kayar.  To regulate fishing trips 
by canoes operating purse seines as well as to achieve some other collective 
ends (particularly, to encourage mutual help groups for sea rescue operations 
and insurance against damages to nets, engines and canoes), a special 
organisation known as the Union des Professionnels de la Pêche Artisanale de 
Guet-Ndar (U.P.P.A.G.) has been created as early as in November 1992
3.  A 
first attempt to limit trips by purse seines has been made in October 1993 when 
55 canoes operating this gear participated in a scheme allowing for only one trip 
every two days.  In order to implement the rotating scheme, the canoes 
concerned were divided into two groups (one of 22 and the other of 23 units) 
according to the quarter of residence of their owners : the first group comprised 
all the purse seines belonging to the quarters of Dack and Pont de Kholé (both in 
Guet-Ndar itself) while the second one included those of Lodo (also in Guet 
Ndar), Senthiaba, and Gokhou Mbathie.  During the year 1994, the experience 
was repeated with a total of 58 participating canoes, and again in 1995.  Yet, 
around the middle of December 1995, the scheme was brought to an end due to 
internal tensions leading to a large incidence of violations.  On the other hand, 
no regulation of fishing effort among line fishermen has ever been attempted in 
Saint-Louis.  
Yoff, as we have pointed out above, was actually the place where the idea 
of fixing quotas of fish landings for line-fishing canoes was initially 
experimented before being emulated in Kayar.  Unlike what is observed in the 
latter fishing site, however, regulation in Yoff is implemented only during the 
period running from January to May when landings are particularly abundant.  A 
special committee composed of twelve members chosen among the seven 
quarters (called penthies) of the village is in charge of monitoring the regulatory 
measure during the above period.  Recently, however, serious tensions have 
appeared in the village that led to the discontinuance of the scheme (in February 
1997).  Opposition to the measures by an important leader eager to recoup 
considerable investment expenditures in fishing assets (purchase of three canoes 
equipped with echo-sounders) has been frequently mentioned as the trigger of 
the crisis.  Yet, at the same time, there seems to be a widespread belief that the 
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members of the committee are not up to their task and should be replaced by 
more dynamic leaders.  We cannot exclude the possibility that personal 
antagonisms and leadership rivalries have contributed to erode the credibility 
and diminish the authority of the committee. 
In trying to emulate their colleagues from Yoff, fishermen of 
Soumbedioune have been much less successful than those of Kayar.  In August 
1994, they decided to enforce a scheme limiting to three boxes the quantity of 
valuable demersal export species (the sea bream and the dentex) that line 
fishermen were allowed to land per day.  Towards that purpose, they set up a 
special committee made up of six members.  After a short period of barely three 
months, the experience had nevertheless to be ended amidst a lot of 
disillusionment. 
Enforcement of regulatory measures is supported by sanction systems that 
are essentially similar between the fishing sites.  In Kayar, when a canoe 
equipped with a purse seine is found exceeding the limit of one fishing trip per 
day, the rule provides that a fine of 100,000 CFA is imposed on the owner.  If he 
refuses to comply, the canoe and the net are confiscated till he pays the fine, and 
they can be ultimately sold in case of prolonged default.  The same system 
applies to canoes equipped with lines : concealment of fish boxes exceeding the 
allowed quota is punished by a fine which was gradually revised upwards (from 
15,000 to 30,000 and then to 50,000 CFA) when it appeared that it was not 
dissuasive enough.  As a matter of fact, since excess catches are not confiscated, 
it may make perfectly good sense to run the risk of being detected and to pay the 
fine in the event of detection.  Such payment, it may be further noted, is required 
under the threat of seizure of the fishing equipment involved.  Delays allowed to 
pay the fine can extend to 10-15 days if the rule-breaker is a well-known 
fisherman with solvency problems.  According to several informants, flexibility 
in meting out punishment was gradually introduced as the rigid procedures that 
were initially devised aroused too much resistance.  Following this account, 
frustrated fishermen started criticising the members of the relevant committees 
for behaving like policemen vis-a-vis their own brethern.   
In Saint-Louis, the amount of the fine imposed on rule-violators is 50,000 
CFA and, as a matter of principle, the owner of the purse seine at fault is not 
permitted to go back to sea unless he has paid the fine.  In Yoff, the amount of 
the fine is 30,000 CFA for line fishermen exceeding their quota (compared to 
50,000 CFA in Kayar).  That all these rules are not necessarily enforced with a 
minimum amount of rigour will soon become evident from the analysis of 
household survey data. 
 
   11
Measures aimed at the allocation of fishing space 
  
In a few cases, measures are aimed at allocating fishing space among competing 
fishing units rather than at limiting fishing effort.  Thus, in Yoff, there is a 
prohibition that forbids canoes with purse seines to operate within a certain 
distance of the beach during the February-May period.  This is with a view to 
reserving access to in-shore waters for beach seines, that are bell-shaped nets 
operated directly from the beach.  These gears have the advantage of creating a 
lot of employment (the hauling of a beach seine absorbs between 30 and 100 
fishermen, among whom many are unskilled workers).   
In Kayar, competition for access to in-shore waters has been a constant 
source of tensions between migrant fishermen (from Saint-Louis) operating 
bottom-set nets and resident fishermen.  Such tensions may easily erupt into acts 
of physical violence as witnessed by the occurrence of several death casualties 
following a violent confrontation in 1985.  The conflict is especially severe 
because it takes on an ethnic dimension.  Indeed, it opposes fishermen using 
passive gears (like bottom-set nets) to those using active gears (such as lines and 
purse seines), and it turns out to be the case that resident fishermen are entirely 
specialised in active fishing techniques while a category of fishermen from 
Saint-Louis operate bottom-set nets to the exclusion of any other technique.  It 
must be borne in mind that fishermen from Saint-Louis have a long tradition of 
mobility along the West African coast, a result of the fact that the fishing zone of 
Guet-Ndar is not sheltered from the strong winds of the Atlantic Ocean and is 
therefore accessible only during a limited part of the year.  As a consequence of 
deep-rooted migration habits, the Saint-Louisiens tend to consider the sea as an 
open access resource that does not belong to any community in particular.   
People from Kayar have an almost opposite conception of sea tenure: being 
originally an agricultural community with lands located not far from the sea, 
they are inclined to view the adjacent water space as their own territory, much in 
the same way as they see their agricultural lands.   
To the extent that conflicting territorial claims between the two fishermen 
communities are likely to affect their ability to initiate and sustain effort-limiting 
schemes, it is appropriate to say a few words about the manner in which this 
problem was tackled and the extent of success or failure achieved.  In February 
1986, the government of Senegal set up a special commission charged with the 
task of defining and monitoring an exclusive fishing zone, marked by buoys, in 
which bottom-set nets were to be prohibited from operating.  This commission is 
composed of four members, namely the chief of the local fisheries 
administration, the head of the local gendarmerie squad, and one representative 
of each fishing community (resident and migrant fishermen).  The 
overwhelming majority of fishermen consider that the commission has largely 
failed in its mission.  Conflicts between bottom-set net operators and other 
fishermen remain pervasive as illegal encroachments upon the exclusive zone   12
are quite frequent.  In most cases, however, they are not dealt with by the 
commission for lack of monitoring equipment (the commission has received a 
canoe equipped with an outboard engine for surveillance operations, yet the boat 
cannot be operated because of a lack of working capital for fuel expenses and 
maintenance of the equipment).   
In these circumstances, fishermen who consider that their rights have been 
infringed upon tend to punish the alleged culprits without informing the 
commission (typically, bottom-set nets are seized and re-sold by resident 
fishermen without the intervention of the commission), thereby creating a 
suspicious atmosphere where reference to justice easily conceals unavowable 
motives and obscure settlements of private accounts.  According to some 
knowledgeable people in Kayar, threats of punishment are still insufficient to 
deter bottom-set net operators from trespassing the boundaries of the exclusive 
fishing zone because the gains from placing these nets in the prohibited area are 




The rationales of the methods used to limit fishing effort  
  
As pointed out above, for purse seines reduction of fishing effort is achieved 
through limitation of the number of sea trips allowed per unit of time while, for 
line fishermen, catches per canoe may not exceed a certain number of weight 
units (measured by boxes of fish).  From the viewpoint of efficiency, neither 
method is ideal in theory.  The former method encourages fishermen to make up 
for the limitation of fishing trips by increasing the productivity of each permitted 
trip, through the lengthening of fishing time or the introduction of appropriate 
technical innovations (e.g., using more performing nets, more powerful engines, 
etc). In a converse way, the latter method induces fishermen to multiply their 
fishing trips with a view to compensating for the limited catches allowed per 
trip.  Waste of capital and labour resources tends to result from such attempts to 
circumvent effort-limiting rules.  Moreover, new entrants should be prevented 
from operating which is obviously not the case as attested by the rapid increase 
in the number of artisanal boats along the Senegalese coast (see supra, Section 
1).   
  One may wonder why schemes devised for purse seines do not comprise 
limitations of landings of the sort applied to line fishermen and, in the other way 
around, why limitations of fishing trips as conceived for purse seines are not 
adopted in the case of line fishing canoes.  In other words, what are the possible 
reasons underlying the selection of different systems of effort regulation, both 
apparently imperfect, depending on the fishing technique employed ?  To begin 
with, the very characteristics of purse seine fishing make catch quotas 
unfeasible.  In this type of fishing, indeed, huge quantities of schooling fishes   13
may be caught with a single sweep of the net handled from one or two motorised 
canoes.  There are two distinct reasons why purse seine fishermen resist the idea 
of having to throw excess produce back to the sea after a successful haul.  The 
first reason lies in the fact that foregoing a catch that has actually been achieved 
entails a much higher subjective cost than foregoing a potential catch that is not 
being attempted.  This is an interesting application of the prospect theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) according to which subjects tend to evaluate 
prospects in terms of gains and losses relative to some reference point, rather 
than hypothetical final states (wealth positions) as assumed by expected utility 
theory.  The so-called value function depicted by these authors captures the idea 
of loss aversion that is critical in the aforementioned fishermen’s attitude (the 
function is steeper for losses than gains).  The second reason has to do with 
insurance considerations.  Indeed, since catches may vary widely from one day 
to the other, imposing a system of catch ceilings means that fishermen would 
have to forego a windfall catch on a ‘lucky’ trip while under poor natural 
conditions their catches are in any way much smaller than the authorised 
maximum.  In other words, a system of catch quotas would prevent fishermen 
from smoothing bad and good catches as effectively as they can do under a 
system of free landings.  In the case of purse seine fishing, therefore, limitation 
of fishing trips unaccompanied by catch quotas appears as a second-best solution 
imposed by technological (a discrete process of fish harvesting) and ecological 
(ample and largely unpredictable catch variations) constraints.   
  Since the catching of fish with hooks and lines is a continuous process that 
can be discontinued almost at will (quantities of fish caught can be ‘finely tuned’ 
by the fishermen), fixing catch quotas per trip is a practical proposition for line 
fishing canoes.  Furthermore, imposing limits on the number of fishing trips per 
day does not appear to be necessary because (i) the average length of a sea trip 
for these canoes is close to 9 hours (average computed over a sample of 80 
fishermen) due to the long distances travelled to reach the fishing grounds, and 
(ii) landing sites are not lighted, forcing markets to close at 6.00 pm and boats to 
return before that time.  In actual practice, therefore, the system of catch quotas 
applied to line fishing conforms with the prescription of economic theory.  As 
for canoes equipped with ice boxes, they undertake much longer voyages since 
they have preserving facilities on board.  They travel up to several hundred 
kilometers, northwards to Mauritania and southwards to Casamance and Guinea 
Bissau.  Their voyages extend over several days and, increasingly, they come to 
exceed a week’s time.  For such canoes, the imposition of a catch quota is 
unacceptable.  This is true even allowing for the fact that quotas could be 
adjusted upwards to take account of the length of each voyage : for example, the 
quota per canoe could be fixed on a daily basis so as to make the total allowable 
quota proportional to the length of the voyage.  Yet, given the high fixed costs 
involved in long journeys to distant fishing grounds, it is doubtful that the 
fishermen concerned would accept to restrict their catches.    14
  Finally, the aforementioned psychological resistance of fishermen against 
forfeiting part of a realised catch explains why the punishment imposed on line 
fishermen who did not comply with catch quotas takes on the form of a 
lumpsum fine set in money terms and does not involve the confiscation of the 
excess catches themselves (see supra). 
 
  From the standpoint of equity, all reported regulatory measures impose an 
equal effort of catch reduction on each fishing unit.  Each purse seine is 
permitted to operate once every day in Kayar and once every two days in Saint-
Louis while each line fishing canoe is allowed a fixed quota in Kayar and Yoff.  
It is remarkable that, as revealed by our household survey, there exists a total 
consensus about this manner of sharing the burden of effort reduction in all the 
fishing villages concerned.  Indeed, all the fishermen interviewed hold the 
opinion that it would be unfair to impose identical quotas (whether in terms of 
landings or fishing trips allowed) on all equipment owners, regardless of the size 
of their capital stock.  As a matter of fact, with such identical quotas, large 
owners would be suddenly deprived of the possibility to maintain the 
profitability of part of their fishing assets.  In addition, crew working on boats 
prohibited from operating would become unemployed unless some employment-
sharing mechanism is agreed upon within the fishing community.  Such 
outcomes appear unacceptable not only to the big owners and the crew labourers 
but also to the smaller owners.  This is a happy situation since big owners are 
often influential persons in the village who play an important role in the 
initiation and enforcement of many collective actions, including regulatory 
schemes.   
  Equally interesting to note is the fact that Senegalese small-scale 
fishermen consider that it would be unfair to award larger quotas to better-
skilled operators.  In the interviews, many of them actually denied that 
significant skill differentials exist in their community and they took pains to 
explain that better performances on the part of some fishermen are only transient 
phenomena likely to be reversed as soon as luck turns its back on them to favour 
other fishing units.  The prevalence of this standpoint has no doubt influenced 
the selection of effort-reducing methods in the villages surveyed : quotas or rules 
regarding fishing trips are uniform or skill-neutral, meaning that they are set 
independently of the skill levels of the fishing teams subject to regulation.   
As the aforementioned interviews indicate, it would be actually 
impossible for fishermen to reach an agreement about their respective skill 
levels and skill differentials are no doubt difficult to measure in an impartial 
manner (even though we do not doubt that fishermen have good clues about skill 
rankings within their community that they do not want to disclose in public).  
We know from economic theory that when quotas are thus set in an uniform 
manner there will probably be an opposition from the better-skilled or better-
endowed agents who may lose or gain little from effort regulation (Johnson and   15
Libecap, 1982  ; Libecap and Wiggins, 1984  ; Libecap, 1990  ; Baland and 
Platteau, 1998, 1999).  We can then predict that the rules laid down in the groups 
considered here are likely to be resisted by the most performing members.   
Unfortunately, we are unable to test that hypothesis since we have no reliable 
indicator of the relative skill levels of sample fishermen. 
 
 
3.  Results from the cross-section analysis of household survey data 
 
Awareness of regulatory measures and their initiators 
 
Respondents have been asked whether hey were aware of any effort-limiting 
scheme for fish species targeted by them and, in the affirmative, who took the 
initiative of the scheme.  Tables 1 and 2 show the results of this inquiry.  From 
the first  table, it can be seen that almost all fishermen operating purse seines in 
Kayar and Saint-Louis or working with hooks and lines in Kayar are actually 
aware of the existence of an effort-reducing scheme in their sector.   
 
Table 1  : Frequencies of fishermen mentioning the existence of regulatory 
measures, as per village and fishing technique 
Technique/site  Did not mention 
the measure 
Did mention the 
measure 
Total 































As is evident from the second table, a large majority of the same categories of 
fishermen have correctly identified the initiators of the measures.  This is 
especially true of line fishermen in Kayar.  On the other hand, no line fisherman 
in Soumbedioune has mentioned the existence of regulatory efforts, a direct 
consequence of the fact that such efforts have been short-lived in this village 
(see supra).  The situation for Yoff is mixed since hardly 60 percent of line 
fishermen have mentioned the measures adopted to control fishing effort for 
demersal species (see Table 1).  This rather poor result is to be ascribed to the 
discontinuance of the scheme in the year 1997 (except for a few days in 
1997) rather than to a lack of awareness of these measures: indeed, a significant 
number of fishermen concerned understood the question as referring to the 
situation that prevailed at the time of the survey (that is, precisely, in the year   16
1997) and not to events that occurred in the past, even the recent past.  It is 
interesting to notice that all those who mentioned the existence of a scheme in 
Yoff also correctly identified the initiators (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2  : Frequencies of fishermen correctly identifying the initiators of 
regulatory measures, as per village and fishing technique 































Perceived incidence of rule infractions  
 
An obvious way of assessing whether a collective scheme works well is by 
determining the rate of infraction of the rules adopted.  Since no objective 
measure of this indicator is available to us, we have to rely on the subjective 
assessments of the people concerned.  In fact, fishermen’s beliefs regarding the 
prevailing extent of rule violations are an important yardstick of the scheme’s 
effectiveness  : it indeed tells us whether sufficient trust exists to make the 
scheme viable in the medium or long run
4.  Table 3 summarises such beliefs as 
they could be inferred from the household survey. 
There are several interesting features emerging from this table.  First, the 
perceived incidence of rule violations is quite large : on the whole, more than 40 
percent of the sample fishermen consider that there are many rule violations 
under the effort-limiting schemes.  As conversations with them reveal, a high 
perceived rate of rule infractions points to a belief that too many operators go on 
violating the limits without being sanctioned  : enforcement of the scheme’s 
prescriptions is low with all the attendant consequences in terms of demotivation 
of participants.  It bears noting that such a conclusion runs counter to the views 
of many leaders of the effort-limiting schemes : according to them, indeed, rules 
are well enforced and, when asked to describe cases of sanctioning by the 
committee in charge, they typically argue that punishing is rarely meted out 
because there are few rule-breakers.  Following their account, only once has a 
fisherman been threatened with confiscation of his equipment and the threat did 
                                                           
4 Note that we have also asked fishermen whether they have themselves violated the rules, yet 
the answers are unreliable and will therefore be ignored (only 9 out of 127 fishermen in the 
restricted sample confessed to have done so).   17
not have to be executed because the culprit paid the fine on the eve of the 
announced seizure.  In game-theoretical terms, a cooperative equilibrium 
outcome is achieved and the threat of sanctions is effective in deterring 
participants from cheating.  As attested by Table 3, however, such is obviously 
not the opinion prevailing among all the fishermen concerned.  If we believe 
them, the temptation to free ride on others’ efforts to reduce landings is 
frequently indulged in by fishermen.  Therefore, what leaders tend to describe as 
flexible practices (see supra, Section 2) too often seem to verge on laxity and 
condonement. 
 
Table 3 : Frequencies of fishermen considering that rule violations are frequent, 
as per village and fishing technique 
Technique/site  Low incidence of 
rule violations  
Large incidence of 
rule violations 
Total 































Second, there are significant variations across effort-limiting schemes of the 
perceived incidence of rule-breaking.  Thus, this incidence is noticeably large 
among line fishermen (around 55 percent of them believe that there are many 
rule violations), whether in Kayar or in Yoff, and it is significantly larger than 
that obtaining for purse seine fishermen (in Kayar and Saint-Louis)
5.  The fact 
that cheating is easier with lines than with purse seines largely accounts for this 
statistically significant difference.  As a matter of fact, it is obviously easier to 
conceal a box of fish that has been caught in excess of the prescribed quota, and 
to dispose of it in a secret manner, than to make an additional, illegal sea trip 
without being noticed (here, mutual monitoring is typically sufficient to detect 
violations).  The fact that sale transactions may take place out at sea or on the 
beach itself but amidst crowds of people gathering at peak landing times greatly 
facilitates the discreet disposal of excess catches under a system of catch quotas.  
We are now in a position to qualify an earlier statement (see supra, Section 2) 
according to which schemes based on catch quotas, as they are applied to line 
fishermen, are more efficient than those based on limitations of fishing trips, as 
they are applied to purse seine fishermen.  The fact of the matter is that the 
                                                           
5  According to the Fisher test, the difference between line and purse seine fishermen is 
statistically significant at 2 percent level of confidence.   18
former effort-reducing method is fraught with more supervision problems than 
the latter so that, allowing for enforcement costs, it may well be more efficient to 
limit sea trips than landings in order to control output. 
  Third, the perceived incidence of rule-breaking among purse seine 
fishermen is larger in Saint-Louis than in Kayar.  This result is to be directly 
related to the eventual failure of the scheme in the former fishing site (by the end 
of the year 1995).  A crucial difference between the effort-limiting schemes 
implemented in the two villages seems to largely explain the poorer 
achievements of Saint-Louis compared with Kayar in terms of enforcement 
effectiveness.  To recall, while purse seines may be operated one time per day in 
Kayar, they are allowed to work only once every two days in Saint-Louis.  This 
feature determines a comparatively strong reluctance to abide by the rule in the 
latter area.  In point of fact, fishermen are eager to work every day because 
ecological conditions may vary significantly from day to day.  They always 
worry that they may miss a bumper catch that will not happen again, or they are 
deeply frustrated if the day they are allowed to operate turns out to be a bad day 
that they will not be able to make up for till after two days or more.  Frustration 
is especially great when the sea is too rough to ride on their day of fishing since 
they then consider that they have been robbed of effective fishing time. 
  Moreover, well-to-do fishermen from Saint-Louis are used to lend their 
fishing equipment to poorer relatives or friends when they themselves want to 
rest or make a pause.  Following the effort-limiting regulation, however, such 
loans of equipment may only take place on days during which the fishing unit 
concerned is allowed to operate.  This prescription is deemed unfair by both 
lenders and borrowers of fishing equipment since the custom is interpreted as a 
way to assist the poor that should not be subject to the regulation.  Being 
permitted to go out at sea only once every two days, well-to-do fishermen feel 
less inclined to forego the use of their equipment to the benefit of poorer fellow 
fishermen.  The latter resent the new situation which their previous benefactors 
blame on the regulatory scheme. 
  Finally, there is in Saint-Louis a strong tradition of so-called ‘special sea 
trips’ (ndiaylou) whereby different members of an extended family join together 
to earn incomes required for a collective purpose, say, financing a wedding, a 
baptism, or helping a relative who has suffered from an accident or illness.  In so 
far as these sea trips are meant to serve the interests of a limited fraction of the 
community, they were supposed to fall under the scope of the effort-limiting 
scheme.  Fishermen nevertheless find it hard to comply with such a requirement 
since they do not privately benefit from the income thus earned.  Hence the 
frequent practice consisting of eschewing the commission’s approval for these 
special sea trips and the consequent suspicion that some fishermen use the 
pretext of a ndiaylou to increase their allowed time of fishing.  The problem is 
less acute in Kayar where the practice of special sea trips is rapidly vanishing. 
    19
 
Identification of fishermen with a negative assessment of rule abidance 
 
Can we say something about the characteristics of the fishermen who believe 
that the incidence of rule-breaking is large ?  In order to answer that question, 
we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable, designated as infrac, 
is a dummy that takes on the value one when the incidence of violations is 
deemed to be large and zero when it is deemed to be low.  Various explanatory 
variables have been tried, controlling for the aforementioned geographical and 
technological factors.  In particular, we want to test whether ownership, wealth, 
and migrant status, age and education level, as well as possible relationships of 
fishermen with fishmerchants bear upon their assessment of the effectiveness of 
regulatory schemes in the sites where they have been attempted for a prolonged 
period (Soumbedioune is therefore excluded).   
Ownership status (designated as owner) is simply measured by a dummy 
with the unit value when the fisherman is an owner of fishing equipment and 
with zero value when he is a crew labourer under the fishing technique 
considered.  Wealth status (designated as wives) could not be measured directly 
and is here approached with the help of a proxy, namely the number of wives 
presently belonging to the fisherman’s household.  (Note that the number of 
wives is strongly correlated with the amount of fishing assets owned by the 
fishermen).  The variable migrkay is another dummy which takes on the value 
one when the fisherman is a migrant from Saint-Louis operating in Kayar, and 
the value zero otherwise.  Age and education are designated by age and educ, 
respectively.  While age is a continuous variable, educ is a dummy with value 
one when the fisherman has more than either six years of coranic schooling or 
six years of primary school in French language, and with zero value otherwise. 
Finally, we have the two control variables, namely the fishing technique used 
and the location of the village.  Designated by pursese, the technological 
variable takes on the value one when the fisherman operates a purse seine and 
zero when he works with hooks and lines.  Note incidentally that there is no 
much meaning in introducing location variables because there is perfect 
correlation between technique and fishing site in two of the three villages (only 
purse seines are regulated in Saint-Louis and only lines in Yoff). 
Finally, exclus is a dummy with value one when the fisherman has an 
exclusive sale agreement with a particular fishmerchant, and zero if he is free to 
sell his catches to whomever he wants.  Exclusive sale agreements in fishing 
always accompany credit relationships.  Thus, when a fisherman takes a loan 
from a lender-merchant to finance either fixed or working capital expenditures, 
he ties himself to the merchant in the sense that he promises to deliver his future 
catches to him on a priority basis  : in other words, as long as the loan is 
outstanding, the indebted fisherman is not entitled to sell his catch to anyone 
else, unless the merchant explicitly allows him to do so.  The implied logic is   20
that the latter does not insist that the former repays the loan principal if he is 
satisfied with his catch performances (interests on the loan are regularly paid 
under the form of lower fish prices offered by the merchant acting as a 
monopsonist).  Results are presented in Table 4 below.  
 
Table 4 : Logit estimate of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs regarding the 
extent of rule-breaking       
 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 127
chi2(7) = 18.80
Prob > chi2 = 0.0088
Log Likelihood = -76.883164 Pseudo R2 = 0.1090
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
infrac | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
owner | -.1421856 .5423711 -0.262 0.793 -1.205213 .9208421
migrkay | -.4854577 .6086912 -0.798 0.425 -1.67847 .7075551
educ | .7311907 .4189728 1.745 0.081 -.0899809 1.552362
age | .0269207 .0195801 1.375 0.169 -.0114556 .0652971
wives | -.6393262 .3257245 -1.963 0.050 -1.277735 -.0009178
pursese | -.8468396 .4076245 -2.077 0.038 -1.645769 -.0479103
exclus | .9533989 .5235918 1.821 0.069 -.0728222 1.97962
cons | -.5938881 .6224267 -0.954 0.340 -1.813822 .6260458
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What can we conclude from this table  ?  First, the coefficient of the 
technological variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent level of 
confidence and has the expected negative sign  : evasion of effort-limiting 
prescriptions is deemed less important in the case of purse seines than in the case 
of lines.  Second, other things being equal, rule-breaking is deemed to be more 
pervasive by comparatively educated fishermen (yet significance is only 
achieved at the 90 percent level of confidence).  Given that we do not measure 
actual rates of infractions, it is difficult to interpret this result.  Competing 
explanations suggest themselves : for example, it might be the case that educated 
fishermen have a better ability to realistically assess the true extent of rule 
violations, or that they are less reluctant to admit to failure in front of outsiders.  
Alternatively, they may be more sceptical than other fishermen about the 
chances of success of complex collective schemes and therefore more prone to 
exaggerate the problems involved or they may themselves be more inclined to 
opportunistic behaviour, hence their relative pessimism about the cooperative 
potential of human groups.  
Third, fishermen involved in sales-tying debts with particular merchants 
have a tendency to perceive a larger incidence of rule violations, presumably 
because they themselves are more prone to evade catch limitations.  Indeed, 
since rules apply to all fishermen irrespective of whether they have exclusive 
sale agreements with merchants (at least this is true in Kayar), it is easy to 
understand why those who are in this situation will be subject to more pressures 
(from their creditor-merchant) to land as much fish as possible.  After all, this is 
the very objective pursued by fishmerchants when they give loans to fishermen.   21
Four, controlling for age, fishermen with more wives tend to be relatively 
optimistic regarding rule violations.  Yet, when the age variable is dropped, the 
coefficient of the wealth variable ceases to be statistically significant.  A close 
look at the data brings out the statistical clue behind this puzzle.  There are 
indeed two specific ways in which age and number of wives interact to produce 
an effect on the assessment of rule-breaking.  (i) For one thing, such assessment 
is comparatively low among rather old fishermen (more than 47 years) who have 
three wives (bear in mind that no one in the sample has more than three wives): 
only 21 percent of them believe that there are many rule violations compared 
with a proportion of 44 percent for all other categories taken together. A 
straightforward explanation is that many fishermen exhibiting this specific 
combination of age and marriage characteristics are well-to-do and influential 
persons who play a leadership role not only in the effort-limiting scheme but in 
many other collective initiatives as well (cleaning of the beach, construction and 
maintenance of the village mosque, assistance in the event of sea accidents, etc).  
Understandably, they may have special difficulties in seeing the dysfunctionings 
of an undertaking with which they are strongly identified.  Or, it may be that 
they are more confident in its ability to eventually succeed in spite of what they 
perceive as minor problems.  
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the above-noted difference of attitude is 
perceptible only in the village of Kayar  : when Yoff and Saint-Louis are 
considered separately from Kayar, there is no effect left of age and number of 
wives.  In other words, the leadership phenomenon is even more marked in 
Kayar than what the above figures indicate  : thus, the proportion of old 
fishermen with three wives who stated a high incidence of rule infractions in 
Kayar is only 10 percent compared with 43 percent for all other categories taken 
together.  This result reflects the fact that in Kayar more than in any other 
fishing village on the Senegalese coast there exists a well-established power 
structure based on traditional ascriptive criteria (social status is critically 
dependent on lineage and seniority under a strongly patriarchal system) 
combined with wealth achievements (translated in fishing assets and wives).  
The agricultural origin of the village where even today cultivation (of 
vegetables) remains an important activity for many fishermen’s families 
especially during the lean fishing season largely accounts for the specific social 
structure of Kayar.  It stands in stark contrast to Saint-Louis, for example, where 
fishing is a completely specialised activity and fishermen therefore migrate to 
other fishing grounds when fish disappear from the local waters or when the sea 
is too rough (see supra).  Presumably because of lesser needs for collective 
action, genuine fishing communities are less cohesive but also more democratic 
than peasant societies. 
(ii) For another thing, it appears that fishermen who have one or several 
wives before reaching 36 years of age have a lower propensity to state high rates 
of rule-breaking than unmarried fishermen belonging to the same age class or   22
than older married fishermen.  Thus, 32 percent of married fishermen aged 
between 24 and 35 years (marriages before 24 years are exceptional) have 
deemed violations of effort-limiting prescriptions to be pervasive as against 57 
percent of those unmarried in the same age bracket and against 50 percent of 
married fishermen older than 36 years but excluding those older than 47 years 
with three wives (bear in mind that unmarried fishermen older than 36 years are 
very few).  Again, this relationship vanishes as soon as Kayar is left out of the 
picture.  When this village is considered separately, differences in the above 
proportions are quite pronounced  : the proportions of Kayar’s fishermen 
reporting a large extent of rule-breaking are 15 percent for those married in the 
24-35 age category, 64 percent for those unmarried in the same category, and 44 
percent for married fishermen older than 36 years but excluding the presumed 
leaders (more than 47 years with three wives).  Table 5 summarises all these 
results.   
 
Table 5 : Assessment of extent of rule-breaking according to certain age and 
marriage characteristics, all villages (Kayar, Yoff, Saint-Louis) and Kayar only 
(figures between brackets) 
Age and marriage characteristics  Proportion of fishermen stating a large 
incidence of rule-breaking 
a. Aged between 24-35 years and unmarried  57 %    (64 %) 
b. Aged between 24-35 years and married   32 %   (15 %) 
c. More than 35 years old and married but 
excluding people of category (e) below 
 
50 %   (44 %) 
d. More than 35 years old and married  43 %   (31 %) 
e. More than 47 years and three wives  21 %   (10 %) 
f. Total average  42 %   (38 %) 
 
Why is it that married fishermen (with either one or two wives) who are 
relatively young (less than 36 years) tend to be optimistic in their statements 
about rule-breaking, and why is it that this phenomenon is observed in Kayar 
and not in Saint-Louis or Yoff ?  We have no ready explanation for such a 
differentiated phenomenon.  Yet, a plausible hypothesis rests on the following 
scenario.  Before reaching their thirties, fishermen are typically bachelors (only 
18 percent of the sample fishermen who are less than 29 years old are married)
6 
working and living with their father whose opinions about the effectiveness of 
the effort-limiting scheme shape their own perceptions to a large extent.  Hence 
the high proportion of them (62 percent in Kayar) who consider the rate of 
infractions to be high (not shown in the table).   
When they enter the 29-35 age category, they usually get married (the 
marriage rate in this category is 82 percent), which implies that they form their 
own household and become more independent of their father (even though they 
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may well continue to operate his boat and nets).  At that stage, they are inclined 
to play an active role in a profusion of organisations such as the Comité 
Villageois de Développement, the local branch of the CNPS (Collectif National 
des Pêcheurs Sénégalais) and the Federation of the GIE (Groupements d’Interêt 
Economique) which are particularly active in Kayar and have been jointly 
involved in initiating and monitoring the effort-limiting scheme.  Participation in 
these collective ventures has the effect of arousing hope among them that 
organisational dysfunctionings are minimal and problems well under control.  
Thus, only 9 percent of married fishermen aged between 29 and 35 years in 
Kayar have expressed pessimistic beliefs about enforcement of the effort-
limiting scheme in particular.   
After a few years of experience, however, fishermen begin to realise that 
collective mechanisms are plagued with the opportunistic acts of a significant 
number of them and they come to a more realistic assessment of their 
effectiveness.  In this, they exhibit more flexibility than the old elite whose 
identification with the regulatory measures is stronger (see supra).  In Yoff and 
Saint-Louis, such a turnaround in beliefs is not observed presumably because 
there are fewer local organisations through which young married people can 
make their own direct experience of collective action.  
In the light of the preceding discussion, it is now possible to improve upon 
the above econometric model by giving up the rather rough explanatory 
variables measuring the fishermen’s age and number of wives and replacing 
them by the two following dummies : leadkay, which takes on the value one 
when the fisherman is presumably a local leader in Kayar, that is, when he is 
more than 47 years old, has three wives and works in Kayar, and the value zero 
otherwise ; and ymarkay, which takes on the value one when the fisherman is a 
(relatively) young married person (between 24 and 35 years old) working in 
Kayar, and the value zero otherwise.  Results are displayed in Table 6. 
One of the expected effects is borne out by the new estimate  : the 
coefficient of the  ymarkay  variable is significant at 95 percent level of 
confidence.  This is not true of the leadkay variable which is not even significant 
at the 90 percent level of confidence.  There is, however, a straightforward 
statistical explanation for this disappointing result, namely that the leadership 
variable is strongly correlated with all the other variables present in the equation, 
except, of course, the ymarkay variable : leaders tend to have higher education, 
to own fishing assets and to operate purse seines.  It is therefore possible to 
make the leadkay  variable become statistically significant by reducing 
multicollinearity through removal of some correlated variable(s).  This is done in 
Table 7 below.  Before offering comments, let us note that collinearity also 
explains why the significance of the coefficient of the educ variable has been 
somewhat reduced compared with the previous estimate.  In the other way 
around, significance of the technological variable’s coefficient has improved 
since it is now significant at 99 percent level of confidence.   24
 
Table 6  : Adjusted logit estimate of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs 
regarding the extent of rule-breaking  
 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 127
chi2(7) = 21.90
Prob > chi2 = 0.0026
Log Likelihood = -75.335438 Pseudo R2 = 0.1269
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
infrac | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
owner | -.4069745 .414509 -0.982 0.326 -1.219397 .4054481
migrkay | -.3085531 .60945 -0.506 0.613 -1.503053 .8859469
educ | .6617543 .4264266 1.552 0.121 -.1740264 1.497535
leadkay | -1.686125 1.131319 -1.490 0.136 -3.90347 .5312191
ymarkay | -1.696 .8687579 -1.952 0.051 -3.398734 .0067345
pursese | -1.025698 .4266358 -2.404 0.016 -1.861889 -.189507
exclus | 1.002479 .5381882 1.863 0.063 -.0523505 2.057309
cons | .1627518 .4070024 0.400 0.689 -.6349582 .9604618
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Table 7, the logit estimate of a new model is presented in which the 
leadership variable has become significant at the 90 percent level of confidence 
at the price of eliminating the ownership variable and making the coefficient of 
the education variable nonsignificant.  Throwing out the education variable in 
addition to the ownership variable would only slightly increase the confidence 
level associated with the leadership variable.  This is because technology, which 
is kept in the regression owing to its critical influence on the assessment of rule-
breaking, is the variable most strongly correlated with leadkay (only 10 percent 
of Kayar’s fishermen older than 47 years and with three wives do not own at 
least a purse seine). 
Table 7  : Adjusted logit estimate of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs 
regarding the extent of rule-breaking (ownership variable omitted) 
 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 127
chi2(6) = 20.92
Prob > chi2 = 0.0019
Log Likelihood = -75.822999 Pseudo R2 = 0.1213
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
infrac | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
migrkay | -.3441515 .6098426 -0.564 0.573 -1.539421 .8511181
educ | .5771422 .4131097 1.397 0.162 -.232538 1.386822
leadkay | -1.896944 1.106175 -1.715 0.086 -4.065007 .271119
ymarkay | -1.699002 .8667965 -1.960 0.050 -3.397892 -.0001124
pursese | -.9869905 .4222457 -2.337 0.019 -1.814577 -.1594042
exclus | .9430304 .5326338 1.771 0.077 -.1009126 1.986973
cons | .0151894 .3768604 0.040 0.968 -.7234434 .7538221
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proportion and identification of fishermen holding various beliefs about the 
effects of regulatory measures (Kayar, Saint-Louis, Yoff) 
 
Fishermen were explicitly asked whether, according to them, the effort-limiting 
measures have the intended effects, both on the economic and environmental   25
levels.  As far as the first level is concerned, the question is about whether 
limitation of supply has the effect of increasing fish prices while, regarding the 
second level, the question is whether it can prevent the fish stock from 
decreasing.  The idea is that beliefs about the likely effects of effort-restricting 
measures have an important influence on the actual behaviour of fishermen vis-
a-vis the rules.  It is indeed difficult to conceive that someone who deems a rule 
to be ineffective will be inclined to follow it at a private cost to himself.  Table 8 
below shows, for Kayar, Yoff and Saint-Louis, the frequencies and proportions 
of fishermen associated with each of the four possible combinations of beliefs.  
In addition, it exhibits the corresponding proportions of fishermen believing that 
rule violations are frequent (shown between brackets).   
 
Table 8 : Frequencies (absolute and relative) of fishermen and perceptions of 
rule-breaking according to beliefs in effects of effort-limiting measures 







































Three facts deserve to be emphasised.  First, in villages where prolonged 
attempts have been made to control fishing effort, more than 43 percent of the 
fishermen reckon that such measures produce both biological and economic 
effects whereas at the other extreme only 16 percent of them deny the two types 
of effects.  Second, there are slightly more fishermen pointing to the biological 
effect (about two-thirds) than fishermen pointing to the economic effect (about 
61 %) while we would have expected the opposite result given the presumably 
more direct visibility of the latter effect.  To put it in another way, the 
probability for people believing in the biological effect to also mention the 
economic effect is only 0.65 (55/84) while the reverse probability is slightly 
higher (55/78, or 0.70).  However, and this is our third point, there is a definite 
relationship between beliefs in effects of effort-limiting measures and beliefs 
regarding the extent of rule-breaking.  More exactly, fishermen who exclusively 
admit to biological or environmental effects often believe that many people 
bypass these measures (this is the case for more than three-fourths of them).     
One interpretation of this finding that immediately springs to mind is the 
following :while the presence of even a few rule transgressors may be sufficient 
to destroy the price effect of effort restriction –a marginal free rider on a cartel   26
may seriously undermine its effectiveness– biological depletion of the fish stock 
may be slowed down even though rule violations occur on a significant scale.  
This said, as the above-sketched history shows, initiation of collective efforts to 
limit fish landings has been clearly motivated by the desire to counter the market 
power of fishmerchants and not by any concern about resource degradation.  It is 
also revealing that leaders often express the view that output regulation for 
economic purposes can be a crucial step towards bringing awareness among 
fishermen of the need to manage the resource for the sake of its conservation. 
Given these facts, we believe that biological concerns are often voiced in a 
rather perfunctory manner : when mentioning biological effects, most of the time 
fishermen are not really thoughtful about what they say.  They do not seriously 
consider the possibility of their being partly responsible for overfishing and, 
therefore, the idea that they could combat environmental degradation by 
restricting their own fishing effort seems alien to most of them.  Revealingly, 
there is a clear tendency among Senegalese fishermen to externalise the problem 
by blaming industrial fishing vessels for the destruction of fish resources.  There 
is no denying that industrial fishing can wreak havoc in maritime fisheries as the 
history of recent decades amply testifies across the world.  This said, small-scale 
fishermen often take too much comfort from this fact to conceal from 
themselves the painful truth that they can also have their share of the blame 
owing to the rapid expansion of the artisanal fishing fleet and the tremendous 
improvements in the artisanal fishing technology (see supra, Section 1). 
When only fishermen who believe in a low incidence of rule violations are 
taken into account, we obtain the distribution presented in Table 9.  Figures are 
now much more congruent with our expectation.  Indeed, almost 70 percent of 
the fishermen signal the economic effect while only 54 percent of them mention 
the biological effect.  Moreover, the probability for fishermen believing in the 
biological effect to also mention the economic effect increases noticeably to 0.83 
while the reverse probability goes down to 0.65.     
 
Table 9 : Frequencies (absolute and relative) of fishermen according to beliefs 
in effects of effort-limiting measures (fishermen believing in low incidence of 
rule violations only) 





























   
We are now in a position to inquire into the determinants of the various beliefs 
held by the fishermen of Kayar, Yoff, and Saint-Louis regarding the likely   27
effects of effort-limiting measures.  Towards that purpose, we have opted for the 
multinomial logit regression method.  We consider that fishermen who did not 
mention either effect is the reference group and we aim at identifying factors 
explaining adherence to the other three groups.  Three regressions have therefore 
been tried the most performing of which are given in Table 10.  In the first 
regression, the dependent variable is the dummy econly, which takes on the 
value one when the fisherman has mentioned the economic but not the biological 
effect, and zero otherwise.  In the second regression, conversely, the dependent 
variable is the dummy bionly, which takes on the value one when the fisherman 
has mentioned the biological but not the economic effect, and the value zero 
otherwise.  And, finally, the third regression attempts to explain ecobio, a 
dummy variable which takes on the value one when the fisherman has 
mentioned the two effects simultaneously, and the value zero otherwise. 
Two explanatory variables are taken into account that have not been 
defined yet.  These are the collus and altinc variables.  Collus is a dummy taking 
the unit value when the fisherman has explicitly mentioned the existence of 
collusive practices among fishmerchants, and zero otherwise.  As for altinc, it is 
a dummy variable indicating the possible presence of alternative income sources 
within the household.  It takes on the value one when there is in the household of 
the fisherman concerned at least one member earning incomes from an activity 
other than fishing (and this includes activities centered on the marketing of fish, 
or organisational activities that bring incomes), and/or when the household owns 
some agricultural land or more than one house (from which rental incomes can 
possibly be earned), and it is set to zero in all the other cases.  
    The first regression is not very successful.  If we except the fact that the 
leadership variable perfectly predicts the econly variable (no fisherman more 
than 47 years and with three wives in Kayar has pointed to the economic effect 
alone), –which explains why leadkay had to be dropped from the equation–, the 
only significant coefficient is that associated with the migrant variable (at the 90 
percent level of confidence).  Since the coefficient is negative, it indicates that 
migrant fishermen native of Saint-Louis and operating in Kayar have a tendency 
to avoid mentioning the economic effect compared with the alternative of not 
mentioning any effect at all. 
Fortunately, the other two regressions yield richer results.  First, the 
coefficient of the educ variable has the expected positive sign and is significant 
at the 99 percent level of confidence in the second regression and at the 95 
percent level in the third one.  In other words, fishermen who are relatively 
educated (they have more than six years of French or Coranic school) tend to 
mention more often the simultaneous presence of biological and economic 
effects, or the presence of the biological effect alone as against the alternative of 
not mentioning any effect at all.  The fact that environmental problems are 
nowadays a widely publicised issue, in the media, at school, and in the meetings 
of various fishermen’s organisations (more particularly, in the CNPS and the   28
Federation of GIE) probably explains why many relatively educated fishermen 
refer to the biological dimension of fish resource management.  Furthermore, a 
general effect of education is to combat fatalistic attitudes and to instil 
confidence in people’s ability to influence their living conditions through 
various forms of purposeful collective action.  This applies not only to 
environmental but also to social, political and economic problems.  In particular, 
educated people may better learn that producers can sometimes change market 
conditions through organising collectively in order to reduce the power of 
merchants. 
 
Table 10 : Multinomial logit estimates of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs 
in economic and biological effects of effort-limiting measures (Kayar, Saint-
Louis and Yoff)   
 
Multinomial regression Number of obs = 127
chi2(29) = 73.98
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -128.13811 Pseudo R2 = 0.2240
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
1.econly |
owner | .9183656 .7140784 1.286 0.198 -.4812023 2.317934
educ | .5887418 .7142158 0.824 0.410 -.8110955 1.988579
migrkay | -1.533036 .8734431 -1.755 0.079 -3.244953 .1788813
infrac | .3324081 .8381308 0.397 0.692 -1.310298 1.975114
leadkay | (dropped)
ymarkay | -.7885451 1.306074 -0.604 0.546 -3.348402 1.771312
techn | .308619 .736175 0.419 0.675 -1.134257 1.751495
altinc | -1.904582 1.401945 -1.359 0.174 -4.652345 .8431798
exclus | -.3325192 .705728 -0.471 0.638 -1.715721 1.050682
collus | .198917 .6799186 0.293 0.770 -1.133699 1.531533
cons | -.1472421 .7656247 -0.192 0.847 -1.647839 1.353355
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
2.bionly |
owner | .0810431 .7996471 0.101 0.919 -1.486236 1.648323
educ | 2.396745 .8109191 2.956 0.003 .8073726 3.986117
migrkay | -3.112952 1.100201 -2.829 0.005 -5.269305 -.9565982
infrac | 3.063997 .8696592 3.523 0.000 1.359497 4.768498
leadkay | 4.460675 1.873074 2.381 0.017 .7895171 8.131833
ymarkay | .1101003 1.51558 0.073 0.942 -2.860382 3.080583
techn | .5525091 .7777238 0.710 0.477 -.9718015 2.07682
altinc | -2.14038 1.375992 -1.556 0.120 -4.837275 .5565149
exclus | .0700108 .391456 0.179 0.858 -.6972289 .8372504
collus | -.4294194 .7370731 -0.583 0.560 -1.874056 1.015217
cons | -1.809203 .9301536 -1.945 0.052 -3.63227 .0138646
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
3.ecobio |
owner | .3948633 .707286 0.558 0.577 -.9913919 1.781118
educ | 1.495693 .6878276 2.175 0.030 .1475759 2.84381
migrkay | -3.992373 1.079191 -3.699 0.000 -6.107549 -1.877197
infrac | 1.639492 .7831023 2.094 0.036 .1046398 3.174344
leadkay | 2.715988 1.671438 1.625 0.104 -.5599707 5.991946
ymarkay | 1.367391 1.102267 1.241 0.215 -.7930125 3.527796
techn | .8664236 .6955223 1.246 0.213 -.4967752 2.229622
altinc | -.459705 1.054752 -0.436 0.663 -2.526981 1.607571
exclus | .0662535 .2802763 0.236 0.813 -.4830781 .615585
collus | -.4073856 .6486115 -0.628 0.530 -1.678641 .8638695
cons | -.2237685 .7441414 -0.301 0.764 -1.682259 1.234722  29
  Second, a major result from Table 10 is that inter-community tensions 
tend to reduce people’s ability to collectively organise.  It is indeed striking that 
the coefficient of the migrkay variable is significant at (close to) 100 percent 
level of confidence in both the second and third regressions, and that it has a 
negative sign (moreover, its size is big).  In other words, migrant fishermen 
native of Saint-Louis and operating in Kayar have a marked tendency to deny 
the existence of economic and biological effects.  Their sceptical attitude vis-a-
vis the effort-limiting scheme seems to be greatly determined by a traumatic 
experience of tense inter-community relations and what they consider to be an 
unsatisfactory solution to gear conflicts involving bottom-set nets (see supra, 
Section 2).  It bears emphasis that the above result is maintained if we club 
together permanent residents of Kayar who are native of Saint-Louis and 
temporary migrants from Saint-Louis who were working in Kayar at the time of 
the survey (and come back every year during what corresponds to the off-season 
in Saint-Louis) instead of considering only the latter category.  This suggests 
that the problem is more a problem of inter-community relations than one of 
migrant-resident opposition.       
Third, in both the second and third regressions, the coefficient of the 
leadkay variable is significant (at 99 percent level of confidence in the second 
regression and at 90 percent level in the third one) and has the expected positive 
sign (moreover, it is quite big).  If the altinc variable with which leadkay is 
strongly correlated is removed from the equation, the level of significance of the 
coefficient associated with leadkay  improves perceptibly, particularly in the 
third equation where significance is now achieved at 95 percent level of 
confidence.  Fishermen older than 47 years and with three wives in Kayar are 
thus inclined to mention the biological effect alone or together with the 
economic effect compared to the alternative possibility of not mentioning any 
effect at all.  We also know that in their statements about rule violations these 
fishermen tend to minimise the problems arising from enforcement of the effort-
limiting scheme.  All these attitudes are typical of leaders deeply involved in the 
initiation and monitoring of the scheme (particularly, through participation in the 
local fishing committees – comité des sennes tournantes and comité de pêche). 
Four, the coefficient of the infrac  variable now considered as an 
explanatory factor is significant at 100 percent level of confidence in the second 
regression and at the 95 percent level in the third regression.  In both cases, it 
has a positive sign, indicating that fishermen who believe the incidence of rule 
violations to be large have a tendency to either mention the biological effect 
alone or the two types of effects simultaneously.  On the other hand, they do not 
seem to prefer mentioning the economic effect alone to abstaining from 
mentioning any effect (the coefficient of infrac in the first regression is non-
significant).  Results in Table 8 are thus neatly confirmed.   
Let us now say a few words about factors that apparently fail to influence 
fishermen’s beliefs regarding the effectiveness of effort regulation.  As is   30
evident from Table 10, such beliefs are not significantly influenced by the 
fishing technology used.  While the mode of restricting effort with line-operating 
canoes gives rise to more monitoring difficulties than the mode used for purse 
seines (see supra), the effects of the former are not reckoned to be weaker than 
the effects of the latter by Senegalese fishermen.  Moreover, there is no 
difference of opinion between owners and crew labourers : the coefficients of 
the owner variable are consistently non-significant.  Bear in mind that the latter 
also benefit from effort-restraining schemes if successful, since labour incomes 
are calculated as a fixed percentage of the catch proceeds.  In addition, beliefs in 
the economic effect of the measures considered do not seem to be affected by 
awareness of existence of collusive practices among fishmerchants.  Fishermen 
who have explicitly pointed to such practices do not believe more than others 
that limiting fishing effort can succeed in increasing fish prices (the coefficient 
of the collus dummy variable is not significant in the first and third regressions).  
Likewise, involvement of fishermen in interlinked credit-cum-marketing ties 
with merchants does not appear either to prompt them to signal the economic 
effect of effort-restraining rules (the coefficient of exclus is non-significant in all 
the regressions).   
Finally, the availability of alternative income sources within the 
household does not encourage fishermen to mention the positive effects of such 
rules.  Yet, it must be borne in mind that the altinc variable is strongly correlated 
with the leadkay variable (see supra).  As the econometric results nevertheless 
show, the effect of altinc seems to be dominated by that of leadkay
 7.  There is 
thus not much support in favour of the following hypothesis : when they can rely 
on complementary sources of income, fishermen are more prone to vindicate 
effort regulation because they are better able to endure the loss of fishing 
incomes in the short or medium term so as to benefit from higher incomes in the 
long term, whether through gaining increased market power or ensuring 
conservation of fish resources.  The fact of the matter is that there is another 
effect running into the opposite direction, namely that fishermen with greater 
alternative income opportunities may pay less attention to their fishing incomes 
and feel less ready to incur sacrifices to make them grow.  This is all the more so 
if alternative incomes originate in fish marketing (usually by the fishermen’s 
wives), since gains accruing to fishermen under the form of increased unit prices 
must then be weighed against the losses suffered by fishmongers in the 
household. 
As we know, fishermen who think that effort-limiting rules are often 
violated have a tendency to simultaneously profess a belief in the biological 
effect of such rules, whether alone or accompanied by the economic effect.  This 
may seem a strange, even perhaps contradictory combination of beliefs.  To 
allow for possible inconsistencies in answers regarding the biological effect, let 
                                                           
7 Thus, if leadkay is removed from the second regression, the coefficient of altinc becomes 
statistically significant.   31
us now estimate a standard logit model in which attention is focused on the 
economic effect.  A binary dependent variable labelled eco simply distinguishes 
between fishermen who mentioned the economic effect (alone or together with 
the biological effect), in which case eco = 1, and those who did not, in which 
case eco = 0.  Results are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 : A logit estimate of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs in the 
economic effect of effort-limiting measures (Kayar, Saint-Louis and Yoff) 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 127
chi2(10) = 14.79
Prob > chi2 = 0.1398
Log Likelihood = -77.292747 Pseudo R2 = 0.0873
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
eco | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
educ | -.2276006 .4145658 -0.549 0.583 -1.040135 .5849334
migrkay | -1.249287 .5945059 -2.101 0.036 -2.414497 -.0840765
infrac | -.7002499 .4201872 -1.667 0.096 -1.523802 .1233019
techn | .246533 .4273818 0.577 0.564 -.5911199 1.084186
owner | .4156334 .4241923 0.980 0.327 -.4157682 1.247035
leadkay | -.871089 1.009327 -0.863 0.388 -2.849333 1.107155
ymarkay | .1622241 .7646928 0.212 0.832 -1.336546 1.660994
exclus | -.6977554 .5188517 -1.345 0.179 -1.714686 .3191753
collus | .0428501 .4070053 0.105 0.916 -.7548657 .8405659
altinc | .9028507 .7451801 1.212 0.226 -.5576755 2.363377
cons | .7588842 .5060493 1.500 0.134 -.2329542 1.750723
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above regression is not globally significant even at 90 percent level of 
confidence (see the chi-square value), yet its significance can be improved to a 
100 percent level by a stepwise elimination procedure.  The variables that are 
significant in Table 11 remain significant in the course of this procedure.  This is 
particularly true of the migrkay variable whose coefficient is significant at 95 
percent level of confidence and has the expected negative sign (this result 
continues to hold if migrants are clubbed together with residents native of Saint-
Louis).  The infrac variable does also affect beliefs in the economic effect (yet, 
significance is achieved only at the 90 percent level) and the coefficient has 
again the expected negative sign : when a fisherman thinks that rule-breaking is 
pervasive, he also tends to be sceptical about the economic effect of an effort-
limiting scheme.  This is expected because free riders can easily destroy the 
price effect of such a scheme by severely competing at the margin.  Such is not 
the case with the biological effect, however, since the presence of free riders 
does not prevent total catches from decreasing.  The coefficient of the educ 
variable is no more significant, bearing out the hypothesis that only biological 
awareness is stimulated by better education (see supra).  The same is true of the 
coefficient of leadkay.  This result is to be related to the fact that almost all the 
leaders of Kayar have stated the economic and biological effects together, while 
none among them has signalled the economic effect alone (see supra).   
Fishermen’s opinions regarding the likely effects of effort regulation (all 
villages and all fisheries)   32
 
  It is interesting to repeat the same econometric exercise as that undertaken 
above but for the whole sample of villages and fisheries, whether they have 
experienced effort-limiting measures or not.  This might enable us to identify 
factors susceptible of explaining why some villages (represented here by Hann 
and Soumbedioune) or some fisheries (represented by bottom-set nets in Kayar, 
lines in Saint-Louis, purse and beach seines in Yoff) have failed to adopt such 
measures.  Towards that aim we have introduced a series of new variables into 
the multinomial logit regressions.  The first of these is a dummy labelled exper, 
with value one if the fisherman has gone through a prolonged experience of 
regulation (lines in Kayar and Yoff, purse seines in Kayar and Saint-Louis), and 
zero otherwise.  The second new variable is migrsou, a dummy with value one 
when the fisherman is a migrant from Saint-Louis operating in Soumbedioune, 
and zero otherwise. 
A third variable is the dummy dist, which takes on the value one if the 
fisherman has stated that he goes farther and farther into the sea to target 
valuable species of exportable value (such as the rose sea bream known as the 
dentex), and zero otherwise.  This variable could not be used in the previous 
regressions because too few fishermen belonging to the restricted sample 
mentioned the aforementioned phenomenon : in actual fact, the majority of those 
who did mention it are line fishermen belonging to Hann and Soumbedioune in 
the Dakar area.  More exactly, while their overall proportion is 11 percent in the 
whole sample
8, they form more than one-third of line fishermen operating 
canoes equipped with ice boxes in Hann and Soumbedioune ; about one-fifth of 
line fishermen operating simple canoes in Kayar, Hann and Soumbedioune ; and 
one-fifth of purse seine fishermen in Hann.  
Lastly, two dummy variables will now be used to distinguish between 
three fishing techniques : pursese and icebox.  The latter dummy takes on the 
unit value for line-operating canoes equipped with ice boxes, and zero 
otherwise.  When the two technological dummies have zero value, it therefore 
means that the technique used by the fisherman is simple lines, bottom-set nets, 
or a beach seine (fishermen using the latter two techniques are not numerous 
enough to make up a separate category).  Results are displayed in Table 12. 
                                                           
8 Of course, the proportion of fishermen who mentioned in a general way that they have to go 
farther into the sea is much higher than this proportion of 11 percent and reflects the 
increasing perception of resource scarcity in the Senegalese waters.   33
Table 12 : Multinomial logit estimates of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs 
in economic and biological effects of effort regulation (all villages and all 
fisheries) 
Multinomial regression Number of obs = 320
chi2(39) = 154.48
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -348.58337 Pseudo R2 = 0.1814
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
1.econly |
exper | 1.299116 .5075321 2.560 0.010 .3043711 2.29386
educ | .0890896 .3457277 0.258 0.797 -.5885242 .7667034
migrkay | -.4880116 .5631902 -0.867 0.386 -1.591844 .615821
infrac | -.9087412 .6939173 -1.310 0.190 -2.268794 .4513118
pursese | -.4855144 .4437077 -1.094 0.274 -1.355166 .3841367
icebox | -.7735517 .5019008 -1.541 0.123 -1.757259 .2101558
altinc | -1.831245 .7990108 -2.292 0.022 -3.397278 -.2652129
dist | 2.543566 .8186858 3.107 0.002 .9389717 4.148161
owner | .1301621 .3495983 0.372 0.710 -.555038 .8153623
leadkay | (dropped)
ymarkay | -1.541686 1.302236 -1.184 0.236 -4.094023 1.01065
exclus | .7595049 .3990512 1.903 0.057 -.0226211 1.541631
collus | .518986 .3608229 1.438 0.150 -.1882139 1.226186
migrsou | (dropped)
cons | -.6354918 .3918712 -1.622 0.105 -1.403545 .1325617
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
2.bionly |
exper | 1.682911 .6473854 2.600 0.009 .4140589 2.951763
educ | .9996363 .4638075 2.155 0.031 .0905903 1.908682
migrkay | -2.082995 .9093227 -2.291 0.022 -3.865234 -.3007547
infrac | 2.068237 .6436474 3.213 0.001 .8067109 3.329762
pursese | -.0235833 .5196588 -0.045 0.964 -1.042096 .9949293
icebox | -.0041546 .787993 -0.005 0.996 -1.548593 1.540283
altinc | -.1295586 .6558398 -0.198 0.843 -1.414981 1.155864
dist | 2.576811 .9921724 2.597 0.009 .6321889 4.521433
owner | .0689103 .4613471 0.149 0.881 -.8353133 .9731339
leadkay | 2.066681 1.603032 1.289 0.197 -1.075203 5.208565
ymarkay | -.2230906 1.442717 -0.155 0.877 -3.050764 2.604583
exclus | -.0020832 .5459322 -0.004 0.997 -1.072091 1.067924
collus | .1698155 .4563487 0.372 0.710 -.7246116 1.064243
migrsou | (dropped)
cons | -2.699395 .59787 -4.515 0.000 -3.871199 -1.527591
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
3.ecobio |
exper | 1.633759 .4713625 3.466 0.001 .7099051 2.557612
educ | .7111716 .3374699 2.107 0.035 .0497427 1.372601
migrkay | -3.07171 .8960977 -3.428 0.001 -4.82803 -1.315391
infrac | .4000893 .5747974 0.696 0.486 -.7264929 1.526671
pursese | -.755428 .4028428 -1.875 0.061 -1.544985 .0341294
icebox | -1.741813 .5801645 -3.002 0.003 -2.878914 -.6047114
altinc | .0006823 .4556902 0.001 0.999 -.892454 .8938186
dist | 2.943645 .8348808 3.526 0.000 1.307309 4.579981
owner | .1595337 .3440594 0.464 0.643 -.5148104 .8338777
leadkay | 2.096566 1.376379 1.523 0.128 -.6010878 4.79422
ymarkay | .392324 1.08429 0.362 0.717 -1.732845 2.517494
exclus | -.0562446 .4087139 -0.138 0.891 -.8573092 .7448199
collus | .3771833 .3467788 1.088 0.277 -.3024908 1.056857
migrsou | 1.727549 .8214984 2.103 0.035 .1174419 3.337656
cons | -.6191525 .3774321 -1.640 0.101 -1.358906 .1206007
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   34
There are a number of interesting results emerging from this table.  Let us 
start with the two new best-established relationships.  For one thing, a 
prolonged, relatively positive experience with effort regulation has the clear 
effect of prompting beliefs in its economic and biological impact (the coefficient 
of exper is significant at 99 percent level of confidence in all three regressions, 
and it is positive).  For another thing, fishermen who target exportable species 
and are ready to travel longer distances than before in order to reach them have a 
neat tendency to reckon the effects of effort regulation as against the alternative 
of denying them (the coefficient of dist is again significant at 99 percent level of 
confidence in all three regressions and it is positive).  In other words, 
progressive fishermen eager to seize on new economic opportunities and bent on 
catching valuable species do not hesitate to stress the importance and 
effectiveness of regulation
9.  This may directly follow from the fact that 
profitability of effort control resulting in increases of unit producer prices is 
likely to increase with the initial level of these prices.   
Some other results confirm previously reported findings (see Table 10), 
such as the negative influence of community divisions in Kayar
10 –again, the 
result holds if all fishermen from Saint-Louis are put together whether they are 
permanent residents or temporary migrants–, or the positive influence of 
education on ecological awareness (see the second and third regressions).  If, 
like in the previous multinomial logit regressions, the leadkay  variable is 
perfectly predicted in the first regression (it had hence to be removed), its 
coefficient is no more significant at the 90 percent level in the two following 
regressions.  Yet, this disappointing result is due to a large extent to 
multicollinearity : when altinc is dropped, the coefficient of leadkay becomes 
significant at the 90 percent level in the second regression and at the 95 percent 
level in the third one. 
   Unlike what was observed in Table 10, exclus has a significant coefficient 
(at 95 percent level of confidence) with positive sign in the first regression, yet 
continues to perform very badly in the other two regressions.   The positive sign 
indicates that fishermen involved in sales-tying debt relationships are more 
aware of the economic advantage of effort regulation.  This is not surprising 
given that they usually get lower prices for the fish they are committed to 
dispose through their lender-merchant.  They are therefore more sensitive to the 
potential gains that can be earned through collective organisation.  On the other 
hand, since there is no reason why such fishermen should be more alert to the 
environmental benefits of collective action, the absence of significant 
                                                           
9 It bears emphasis that progressivity is measured with respect to the fishing technique and, 
even more, to the site concerned.  Thus, a line fisherman of Hann for whom dist = 1 is not 
necessarily more progressive than a line fisherman from Saint-Louis where opportunities are 
less favourable.   
10 Note however that the coefficient of migrkay is no more significant in the first regression.   35
relationships between exclus and either bio or ecobio (see the second and third 
regressions) is perfectly understandable.   
It bears emphasis that some categories of fishermen in some villages have 
a higher propensity to accept exclusive sale agreements with merchants than 
others (see Table 13).  While about one-fourth of the total sample of Senegalese 
fishermen are in this situation, the proportion shoots up to much higher figures 
for operators of bottom-set nets (59 percent in Kayar and 76 percent in Saint-
Louis), and for line fishermen in Hann (71 percent) and Saint-Louis (41 
percent).  Here lies a powerful factor accounting for the lack of effort-restraining 
mechanism in all these fisheries, since it is hard to see how such a collective 
mechanism could take root when a large number of the fishermen concerned are 
entangled in private exclusive relationships with particular merchants.  The fact 
that in Kayar and Yoff, where effort regulation has occurred, only 22 and 17 
percent, respectively, of the fishermen are engaged in this type of relationships 
deserves to be strongly emphasised.  The presence of an endogeneity bias –
exclusive commercial relationships with merchant-creditors tend to disappear 
when effort regulation is adopted– is rather unlikely in so far as owners of 
fishing assets cannot easily terminate such relationships. 
 
Table 13 : Proportions of fishermen engaged in exclusive sale relationships with 
merchants, according to fishing techniques and sites
Technique/Site Kayar St-Louis  Yoff  Hann  Soumbedi. Total 
Line  22.2  % 40.9  % 16.7  % 71.4  % 24.0  % 31.2  % 
Line + ice box  -  -  0.0 %  15.0 %  24.0 %  19.6 % 
Purse seine  13.9 %  15.0 %  0.0 %  26.7 %  -  13.3 % 
Beach  seine  -  - 0.0  % -  - 0.0  % 
Bottom-set net  58.8 %  76.5 %  -  -  -  67.6 % 
Total  26.3 %  35.4 %  6.4 %  34.7 %  24.0 %  25.6 % 
 
The two technological dummies (pursese and icebox)  figuring out in the third 
regression have a significant influence on the dependent variable : since the 
coefficients are both negative, the implication is that simple line fishermen have 
a higher propensity to state the economic and biological advantages of effort 
regulation simultaneously.  It also bears noticing that in the first regression the 
coefficient of icebox becomes significant at 95 percent level of confidence (and 
it is negative) when the variable exclus with which it is correlated is being left 
out.  The most solid result regarding the role of technology is therefore that line 
fishermen operating canoes equipped with ice boxes are comparatively reluctant 
to recognise the economic effect of effort limitation (whether in conjunction 
with the biological effort or not).  This probably reflects the fact that these 
fishermen operate in conditions (long journeys out at sea) that make a collective 
scheme of effort regulation especially hard to put into practice (see supra, 
Section 2).   36
Finally, migrants from Saint-Louis operating in Soumbedioune exhibit a 
stronger tendency than residents to declare the economic and biological effects 
of effort regulation (significance at the 5 percent level in the third regression).  
Moreover, they never mention either effect exclusively (migrsou is perfectly 
predicted in the first and second equations).  The coefficient of migrlou in the 
third regression ceases to be significant if migrants from Saint-Louis are clubbed 
together with permanent residents native of Saint-Louis, pointing to different 
opinions among the Saint-Louisiens depending on whether they are migrants or 
residents.  Here, unlike what we observed for Kayar, the migrant-resident 
difference seems to be more relevant than the ethnic dimension  as such.  
Since infrac significantly and positively affects the bionly variable (see 
the second regression), it is worthwhile repeating the kind of econometric 
experiment carried out in Table 11, that is, estimating a standard logit model in 
which the dependent variable is the binary dummy eco.  Results are shown in 
Table 14. 
Table 14 : A logit estimate of the determinants of fishermen’s beliefs in the 
economic effect of effort-limiting measures (all villages and all fisheries) 
 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 320
chi2(14) = 39.75
Prob > chi2 = 0.0003
Log Likelihood = -196.27235 Pseudo R2 = 0.0920
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
eco | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
exper | 1.019205 .3698983 2.755 0.006 .2942176 1.744192
educ | .0937508 .2533603 0.370 0.711 -.4028262 .5903278
migrkay | -.8964948 .4720718 -1.899 0.058 -1.821739 .028749
infrac | -1.239734 .3911285 -3.170 0.002 -2.006332 -.4731364
pursese | -.6519487 .3033652 -2.149 0.032 -1.246533 -.0573638
icebox | -1.102867 .4149233 -2.658 0.008 -1.916102 -.2896326
dist | 1.731236 .5059418 3.422 0.001 .7396079 2.722863
owner | .1241633 .2640678 0.470 0.638 -.3934 .6417266
leadkay | .1860784 .8362991 0.223 0.824 -1.453038 1.825194
ymarkay | -.3800427 .74514 -0.510 0.610 -1.84049 1.080405
exclus | .2534723 .3002832 0.844 0.399 -.335072 .8420165
collus | .4436479 .2631905 1.686 0.092 -.072196 .9594918
altinc | -.3260308 .375968 -0.867 0.386 -1.062915 .410853
migrsou | -.0977062 .783761 -0.125 0.901 -1.63385 1.438437
cons | .2034727 .2928779 0.695 0.487 -.3705575 .7775028
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The main findings of this more condensed estimate centered on the economic 
effect are the following.  (i) as expected, the role of education vanishes ;  (ii) a 
prolonged and serious experience positively influences expectations regarding 
the economic impact of effort regulation (significance is achieved at the 1 
percent confidence level) ;  (iii)  migrant fishermen in Kayar are sceptical about 
this impact (significance at the 95 percent level), yet do not behave in a specific   37
manner in Soumbedioune
11 ;  (iv) understandably, a high perceived rate of 
infractions tends to destroy the belief that limiting effort is likely to cause an 
increase in fish prices (significance almost at the 100 percent level) ;  (v) fishing 
technology has a decisive bearing upon the latter belief : line fishermen working 
with simple canoes are the most prone to trust economic regulation  ;  (vi) 
dynamic fishermen targetting exportable species are highly confident that the 
economic effect can materialise (significance at almost 100 percent confidence 
level) ; (vii) the impact of leadership in Kayar has vanished
12, not a surprising 
fact given that what mostly characterises leaders from Kayar is their (very) 
strong proclivity to mention both the economic and the biological effects of 
regulation  ; (viii) the above-substantiated effect of credit-cum-marketing 
relationships has disappeared to the benefit of a timid (positive) effect (at only 
90 percent confidence level) of concerns about collusive practices among 
fishmerchants.  The vanishing of the exclus effect is not surprising either since 
an exclusive sale relationship with a fishmerchant affects the prices obtained for 
the fish landings but not the biology of fish resources.  Therefore, we may 
expect that fishermen entangled in such exclusive relationships hold particularly 
strong views regarding the price effect of output regulation yet do not mention 
that effect in combination with biological impacts. 
 
 
Support for effort regulation among line fishermen without relevant experience 
 
Line fishermen who did not really have the experience of effort regulation have 
been asked if, according to them, it was a good idea to limit the number of fish 
boxes allowed to be landed by each canoe.  In case they have answered yes to 
that question, a new dummy labelled linesupp is set to one, while it is set to zero 
otherwise.  We now attempt to identify the characteristics of these fishermen 
that are susceptible of explaining their attitude vis-a-vis the imposition of 
landing quotas. The sample size is 107 units comprising line fishermen operating 
simple canoes in Saint-Louis, Soumbedioune and Hann, and canoes equipped 
with ice boxes in Soumbedioune, Yoff, and Hann.  Two new explanatory 
variables have been introduced to distinguish between three different locations.  
These are the location dummies, soumb  and  slouis, where soumb = 1 if the 
fisherman operates in Soumbedioune, and zero otherwise, while slouis = 1 if he 
operates in Saint-Louis, and zero otherwise (when soumb  =  slouis  = 0, the 
fisherman operates in Hann or in Yoff for which we have only one observation).  
Results are presented in Table 15. 
                                                           
11 This is due to the fact that, if migrant fishermen in Soumbedioune have a strong proclivity 
to mention the economic effect together with the biological effect, they never mention it 
alone.  
12 In this case, removing the altinc variable would not help establish a significant relationship 
between leadkay and eco.   38
   The most significant result is that, as expected, line fishermen operating 
canoes with ice boxes have a strong proclivity to believe that catch quotas are 
detrimental to their interests (the negative coefficient of icebox is significant at 
100 percent level of confidence).  Another striking result emerging from the 
table is that, other things being equal, fishermen from Soumbedioune show more 
support for regulation than fishermen from the other villages.  This may appear 
surprising since an attempt at limiting landings in Soumbedioune ended in quick 
failure (see supra, Section 2).  It bears noticing that (simple) line fishermen from 
this village have frequently complained (in the preliminary interviews conducted 
during the first phase of the fieldwork) that, owing to oversupply, they are not 
able to sell all the fish harvested or are compelled to dispose of it at unprofitable 
prices through small merchants or women buyers.  Priority is apparently given 
by bigger merchants to line fishermen operating canoes with ice boxes.  The 
other line fishermen seem to believe that restriction of their fishing effort is the 
best way available to restore their bargaining power vis-a-vis these sizeable 
merchants.  Still, the question remains as to why the same phenomenon is not 
observed in Hann, a village also located in the market area of Dakar.   
 
Table 15 : Support for effort regulation among line fishermen in the sample 
villages  
 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 107
chi2(12) = 47.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -48.514053 Pseudo R2 = 0.3306
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
linesupp | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
educ | .207576 .5370808 0.386 0.699 -.845083 1.260235
icebox | -3.202455 .766837 -4.176 0.000 -4.705428 -1.699482
altinc | 3.310454 1.502303 2.204 0.028 .3659935 6.254914
dist | 1.951435 .851312 2.292 0.022 .2828941 3.619976
ymarkay | .3827632 .7028755 0.545 0.586 -.9948475 1.760374
leadkay | -.5202497 1.638609 -0.317 0.751 -3.731864 2.691365
owner | .1527361 .5549993 0.275 0.783 -.9350426 1.240515
soumb | 1.742825 .7071045 2.465 0.014 .3569259 3.128725
slouis | .5519409 .7398247 0.746 0.456 -.8980888 2.001971
exclus | -.2274208 .5664152 -0.402 0.688 -1.337574 .8827326
collus | -.035761 .5649404 -0.063 0.950 -1.143024 1.071502
migrsou | -2.852191 1.459997 -1.954 0.051 -5.713734 .0093513
cons | -.7140407 .7971001 -0.896 0.370 -2.276328 .8482468
 
Also worth noticing is the fact that migrants from Saint-Louis operating in 
Soumbedioune are less in favour of effort regulation than other fishermen.  This 
is typical of migrants only since, if we club together migrants with residents 
from Saint-Louis operating in Soumbedioune, the effect vanishes.   
Two last results come out with a high level of significance.  For one thing, 
progressive line fishermen (those who go far into the sea in order to catch the 
most valuable species) are more supportive of effort-limiting measures than 
others.  This confirms previous findings for which an explanation has been   39
advanced : profitability of effort control is likely to be higher for this category of 
fishermen.  For another thing, those fishermen who have alternative income 
opportunities also seem to be more in favour of catch quotas, even though we 
did not previously find evidence of their better awareness of the potential 
advantages of regulation.  Thanks to their complementary incomes, such 
fishermen can more easily tide over a waiting period till the results of effort 
limitation materialise, which may well explain their stronger support for it.      
 
 
Fishermen’s support for a centralised marketing organisation 
 
Finally, all the sample fishermen have been asked the following question : do 
you think that you could personally benefit from the setting up in your village of 
an association intended for the centralised sale of fish catches (in the way it is 
done in Joal for the octopus) ?  In case they have answered yes to that question, 
a new dummy labelled saleorg is set to one, while it is set to zero otherwise.  In 
attempting to uncover factors susceptible of explaining fishermen’s assessment 
of a marketing organisation run by themselves, we have used another standard 
logit model now estimated over the whole sample.  The results, shown in Table 
16, are good since quite a few explanatory variables tried in this model turn out 
to be associated with (sometimes highly) significant coefficients. 
 
Table 16  : Determinants of fishermen’s support for a centralised marketing 
organisation 
 
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 320
chi2(14) = 44.70
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -184.83454 Pseudo R2 = 0.1079
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
saleorg | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
exper | .4162337 .3595115 1.158 0.247 -.2883959 1.120863
educ | .334932 .2624046 1.276 0.202 -.1793715 .8492355
migrkay | -.8093489 .4872589 -1.661 0.097 -1.764359 .1456609
infrac | .6202775 .413215 1.501 0.133 -.1896091 1.430164
pursese | -.5653727 .315153 -1.794 0.073 -1.183061 .0523157
icebox | .395253 .4307179 0.918 0.359 -.4489387 1.239445
altinc | -.9425862 .3830878 -2.460 0.014 -1.693425 -.1917479
dist | -.8921823 .4165472 -2.142 0.032 -1.7086 -.0757648
leadkay | 2.014534 1.14858 1.754 0.079 -.2366404 4.265709
ymarkay | -.7597875 .7100298 -1.070 0.285 -2.15142 .6318454
owner | .8116015 .274771 2.954 0.003 .2730602 1.350143
exclus | .1535129 .3171832 0.484 0.628 -.4681548 .7751806
collus | .1626724 .2741367 0.593 0.553 -.3746257 .6999704
migrsou | -1.274166 .7779488 -1.638 0.101 -2.798918 .2505855
cons | .1771256 .298632 0.593 0.553 -.4081824 .7624335
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
First, in Kayar, if migrant fishermen from Saint-Louis tend to oppose the 
creation of a centralised marketing organisation (see the effect of migrkay), the   40
core leadership of native fishermen takes up a favourable stance (see the effect 
of leadkay).  In actual fact, some of the latter have actually made a trial in that 
direction by acquiring a second-hand truck in order to transport the collected fish 
to Dakar and sell it directly to the fish-processing factories.  This experience was 
far from successful, however, since the leaders concerned were eventually 
obliged to rent the truck out to local fishmerchants in order to be able to repay 
the debts incurred.  In Soumbedioune, opposition from migrant fishermen native 
of Saint-Louis is also observed and the effect is again significant only at 90 
percent level of confidence.  Yet, if residents native of Saint-Louis are clubbed 
together with the migrants, the (negative) effect becomes significant at 95 
percent level.  The difference of opinion regarding the creation of a commercial 
association has more to do with community feelings than with a migrant-resident 
division
13.   
Second, owners of fishing assets turn out to be much more supportive of a 
centralised marketing organisation than ordinary crew labourers (significance at 
almost 100 percent confidence level).  A plausible reason for the latter’s 
reservations lies in the fact that a sales organisation might create opportunities 
for asset owners, in collusion with managers, to underreport the prices obtained 
to their crew labourers and thereby rob them of part of their due share of the 
catch proceeds.  Open sales carried out on the beach are much more transparent 
than those which would be run through a centralised organisation.
Third, dynamic fishermen bent on catching valuable species in distant 
fishing grounds are opposed to the marketing organisation.  This contrasts with 
their positive attitude vis-a-vis catch quotas.  There is, of course, no 
contradiction here since the two methods to achieve higher producer prices are 
entirely different and there are solid reasons to believe that implementing an 
effort-restraining scheme is a much less arduous task than building up a viable 
sale organisation.  Four, fishermen operating purse seines have a negative 
opinion about the role of such an organisation compared to other fishermen.  The 
explanation behind this differential attitude lies in the characteristics of the 
produce.  Indeed, the demersal species caught by fishermen operating lines and 
bottom-set nets are luxury products that can be sold directly by a fisherman’s 
organisation to specialised export companies.  The same cannot be said of the 
pelagic species harvested by purse seines which are mainly destined for 
domestic markets (and other African countries) and necessitate a complex and 
decentralised network of fishmerchants operating at wholesale and retail levels.   
Finally, fishermen with alternative income opportunities appear to be 
opposed to centralised marketing organisations in the hands of the fishermen 
themselves (the coefficient associated with altinc is highly significant).  Our 
presumption is that, when some household members have a business experience 
in fishmarketing or in another sector, they have a more realistic appraisal of the 
                                                           
13 The opposite result is observed in Kayar where the effect vanishes when residents from 
Saint-Louis are added to the migrants.     41
difficulties involved in the running of this kind of organisation and they tend to 
communicate their scepticism to their relatives specialised in fishing activities.
  
4.  Results from time-series analysis of price and output data 
 
So far, in our discussion centered on the incentive aspects of effort-limiting 
schemes, we have implicitly assumed that effort regulation is effective in 
achieving its economic objective of increasing producer prices.  This is not 
necessarily the case, however.  In order to assess the fishermen’s ability to exert 
market power in a sustainable way, we must establish whether demand elasticity 
is greater or lower than –1 for every regulated product.  In other words, there is 
obviously a demand side to our story that we address in this final section.  A 
value below –1 for demand elasticity would insure that a monopoly can find one 
positive level of output that maximises profit and, therefore, that the fishermen’s 
cartel can precisely define the target level of aggregate output.  
Estimating demand elasticity is usually a tricky operation because prices 
and quantities are simultaneously determined by supply and demand.  Fishing is 
nevertheless a special activity in this regard : when sellers meet buyers on the 
shore, it is too late to adjust the quantity.  On the other hand, the possibility of 
conserving fish in freezing facilities enables speculation although it does not 
leave the quality of the product unaffected.  Expected future prices must clearly 
enter the determinants of demand if this effect is to be taken seriously. This 
reintroduces a simultaneity problem in the demand curve, in so far as future 
prices may be a function of current prices.  Fortunately, past prices and seasonal 
dummies provide good exogenous variables to instrument for expected future 
prices.  Besides quantity and expected future prices, prices of substitute goods 
also affect demand.  These are of course endogenous (since a good is a substitute 
of its substitutes) and can be instrumented for on the basis of past values and 
seasonal dummies as well.  
On the basis of these considerations, we assume that market data are 
generated by a three-step process. First, fishermen form an expectation of the 
day-price on the basis of past prices and of the season.  Second, quantities are 
determined by the joint effect of the fishermen’s willingness-to-sell at the 
expected price and of a random shock.  And, third, actual prices are fixed by the 
demand curve.  Two points deserve to be made at the present stage.  On the one 
hand, we have no special hypothesis to test about step 2 in this process.  Indeed, 
supply curves may well be positively sloped or backward bending since they 
involve choices between labour and leisure that are known to exhibit a wide 
variety of possible patterns.  On the other hand, besides our main hypothesis that 
demand curves have an elasticity below –1, we want to test whether expectations 
may be formed with a high degree of accuracy in step 1.  This is actually a 
condition for an efficient computation of the target level of aggregate output : if   42
prices are not correctly anticipated, a cartel is bound to fail because day-to-day 
losses are not likely to be compensated by gains on the average if fishermen are 
not perfectly patient.   
Mathematically speaking, we are estimating the following system of 
equations : 
 
(expectations)   Pt = α  + β *s + γ *B(P) + ut  ,  with Pt
e = Pt - ut 
 
(supply)     log Qt = δ + ε  * log Pt
e + vt 
 
(inverse demand)  log Pt = φ  + ρ  * log Qt + σ * log Pt+1
e + θ * log Pt
subst + wt 
 
where Pt is the price at time t, s is a vector of eleven dummy variables 
representing the month of the year, B(P) is a vector of lagged prices (the number 
of lags is chosen through a standard ARIMA procedure, i.e. by inspecting 
correlograms ; typically, zero or one lag is used), Qt is the quantity at time t ; u, 
v and w are normally distributed residuals (with seasonal heteroscedasticity) ; 
parameters to be estimated include β and γ , which are real vectors, and α, δ, ε , φ  
and ρ , which are real numbers.  
An inverse demand curve is estimated because observation errors occur 
frequently in prices and rather infrequently in quantities ; it is safer to let those 
errors appear in the residuals of an inverse demand function than to estimate a 
demand curve with a stochastic regressor (remember that expected future prices 
and prices of substitute goods are replaced by an instrumental variable in this 
equation).  
If fishermen are right in reporting commercial effects wherever fishing 
effort is controlled, these effects ought to appear in our estimations of demand 
curves.  It is evident that in markets where prices are insensitive to supplied 
quantities it cannot be instantly profitable to regulate fishing effort, even though 
in this case it may make sense to prevent the overexploitation of fish resources 
in order to keep down current cost levels.  We should therefore not expect a one-
to-one correspondence between poorly elastic demand curves and the existence 
of catch quotas in fishing villages.  This said, it is worth bearing in mind that a 
significant result of our household survey is the following: fishermen who 
believe that regulation has a desirable effect on the preservation of natural 
resources also tend to expect a beneficial commercial impact, except when they 
also report high rates of rule violations (see supra).  Since it is rather unlikely 
that regulation is adopted for the sake of the biological effect only, there is a 
strong case for the a priori claim that regulation should be observed only where 
demand is relatively inelastic. 
Unfortunately, due to difficult logistical problems, we could only obtain 
from the CRODT (Centre de Recherches Océanographique de Dakar-Thiaroye) 
monthly price and landing data pertaining to the years prior to devaluation (in   43
1994).  Moreover, as many price series are incomplete, we have to confine our 
attention to three fishing sites (Kayar, Hann, and Saint-Louis) and to a restricted 
number of seven fish species (the flat sardine; the round sardine; the white 
grouper known locally as thiof; a thread fin called capitaine in the Francophone 
and cassava fish in the Anglophone part of West Africa; and three fish species 
belonging to the sea bream family, the rose sea bream, and the so-called pagre 
and dentex).  The conclusions below must therefore be taken with the required 
caution. 
In Table 17, we present the result of our econometric estimates for the two 
types of sardines, the only pelagic species for which data are available. 
 
Table 17 :  Econometric estimates of inverse demand functions for sardines 
(based on price and output data pertaining to the years 1991-1993)† 





β   
(inverse demand 
elasticity) 
γ   
(substitution 
effect) 
δ   
(speculation 
effect) 
Kayar  Round  -0.01     0.46 **  --
 
  Flat      -0.20 **     0.97 **  -- 
St-Louis  Round  -0.07          -0.00  -- 
  Flat       -0.11 **    1.20 **  -- 
Hann  Round  -0.03  0.36 *    .60 * 
  Flat  -0.08  0.40 *             .19 
(†) ** indicates significance at the 95 percent confidence level while * indicates significance 
at the 90 percent level. 
 
It is evident from the table that it is only for flat sardines in Kayar and Saint-
Louis that inverse demand elasticities are significantly different from zero.   
Elasticities are higher than –1, which is conform to theory since these are inverse 
demand elasticities.  For round sardines in the three fishing sites and for flat 
sardines in Hann, one cannot reject the hypothesis of a perfectly elastic demand, 
which should preclude any regulation effort from causing an increase in prices.  
These results are not really surprising in the light of the following 
circumstances.  First, in Kayar and St-Louis, sardines are not refrigerated but are 
sold immediately to artisanal fish processors who condition fishes for local 
consumption.  Second, Hann is a suburb of the capital Dakar and freezing 
sardines for other markets (such as cities in the hinterland) is much more 
common there.  Moreover, the area of Dakar forms a large integrated market 
strongly articulated with export outlets, contrary to Kayar and Saint-Louis which 
are not within easy reach.  Third, round sardines are bigger than the flat ones and 
therefore more convenient for refrigeration.  
It is probably not coincidental that purse seines, which target only pelagic 
species among which flat sardines are important, are regulated in Kayar and 
Saint-Louis but not in Hann and Yoff (bearing in mind that, like Hann, Yoff is 
located in the suburb of Dakar).  Still, one must not lose sight of the fact that   44
even where demand is perfectly elastic, regulation can be profitable if marginal 
costs are (locally) steeply increasing.  This condition may be fulfilled if scarcity 
of fish is sufficiently acute to compel fishermen to reach more distant fishing 
grounds.  Finally, it may be noted that, as expected, all substitution effects are 
positive, indicating actual substitutability (rather than complementarity) between 
fish species. 
  As far as demersal species caught by hooks and lines (or bottom-set nets) 
are concerned, estimations of inverse demand functions yield complicated 
results from which Kayar however emerges as the most suitable location for 
effective attempts at effort regulation.  It is indeed apparent that demersal 
species for which demand is not perfectly elastic are the thiof in Kayar (but not 
in Saint-Louis and Hann); the capitaine in Kayar; the rose sea bream in Kayar; 
and the pagre in Saint-Louis and Hann. 




4.1  For local-level effort regulation to succeed, it is obviously important that 
market conditions are such that fish prices respond to supply variations.  To put 
it in another way, if demand is perfectly elastic with respect to prices, such as 
happens under well-integrated markets approximating perfect competition, 
restriction of landings by fishermen will not cause any price increase.  This said, 
one cannot rule out the possibility that effort limitation has the effect of reducing 
harvesting costs since fish scarcity may determine steeply increasing cost 
functions.  Data available to us did not permit to test for the latter eventuality 
but, to a limited extent, they allowed us to assess market conditions.  The main 
conclusion is that significantly negative price-effort elasticities are not 
systematically observed and, when observed, they often concern the village of 
Kayar.  Unfortunately, price and output data available date back to the pre-
devaluation period (before 1994) and it is therefore quite possible that market 
conditions have changed in the meantime.  It is thus revealing that fishermen of 
Kayar themselves have recently confessed to us that the impact of their effort-
limiting measures seems to have decreased : they have indeed observed that the 
price of some species continues to fall even though they have tightened the catch 
quotas.  We are nevertheless entitled to assert with sufficient confidence that, 
historically, market conditions have favoured effort regulation in Kayar 
compared with the other sites.  The fact that precisely this village has been the 
most successful in its regulation efforts is probably not coincidental. 
 
4.2  Assuming away all kinds of incentive problems, we know that imposing 
catch quotas is theoretically the best way of controlling effort in order to 
enhance the producers’ market power or to conserve the resource.  Once labour 
incentive problems are taken into account, if the adoption of catch quotas   45
appears optimal for line fishermen, limitations of fishing trips seem to be better 
feasible for purse seine fishermen.  And when problems arising from the 
monitoring of effort restraint are also paid attention to, the system of catch 
quotas applied to the former category seems less efficient than limitations of 
fishing trips chosen by the latter category.  This goes a long way towards 
explaining why the extent of rule-breaking is perceived to be larger with respect 
to catch quotas.  In a second-best world pervaded by all kinds of incentive 
problems, restriction of effort therefore seems to have better chances to succeed 
in the case of purse seines than in that of line fishing to which limitations of sea 
trips can hardly be applied. 
 
4.3  Line fishermen operating canoes equipped with ice boxes and used to 
make long journeys out at sea are especially difficult to bring under any effort-
limiting scheme due to a combination of incentive problems particularly hard to 
overcome.  It is thus not surprising that nowhere along the Senegalese coast did 
we find any sign of attempts towards regulating their fishing efforts.  Direct 
competition from this type of sophisticated fishermen (they target the same fish 
species) may account for the fact that regulation has not been adopted by simple 
line fishermen in Hann and Soumbedioune where ice boxes are found, yet 
cannot explain why it could work with simple line fishermen in Kayar but not in 
Saint-Louis since in both places no ice boxes are used.  The presence of more 
favourable market conditions for demersal species in Kayar than in Saint-Louis 
(and Yoff where the regulatory scheme has been discontinued) constitutes an 
important advantage for Kayar’s line fishermen.  Another advantage in favour of 
the latter is the existence of a strong traditional leadership structure.   
Unfortunately, we are unable to disentangle the respective effects of these two 
favourable factors.   
What we may nevertheless note is that Kayar’s leadership, which is 
apparently rooted in the hierarchical socio-political structure of what was 
originally an agricultural village, has been able to impose a relatively good 
measure of discipline and sense of common purpose on people well-known for 
their inveterate tendencies towards individualism.  This factor is all the more 
important as Kayar suffers from a major weakness arising from severe inter-
community tensions between fishermen native of Kayar itself and those native 
of Saint-Louis.  It is noteworthy that the division is not simply a classical 
opposition between migrants and residents since permanent residents who were 
born in Saint-Louis do not seem to think and behave differently from temporary 
migrants from the same area.  Differences in attitudes between local fishermen 
and Saint-Louisiens have also been empirically substantiated for Soumbedioune, 
yet, in the latter area, differences manifest themselves along the resident-migrant 
vector rather than along the communal dimension per se. 
Inter-community tensions in Kayar have their origin in grave conflicts 
between operators of bottom-set nets (exclusively people from Saint-Louis) and   46
users of other fishing techniques, especially if they are native of Kayar.  In spite 
of repeated efforts, the vexed problem of how to allocate among these two 
categories the limited fishing space available close to the shore has never been 
solved in a satisfactory way.  Furthermore, bottom-set net operators have always 
refused to adopt an effort-limiting scheme even though they target valuable 
demersal species (such as soles and groupers) that are also harvested by line 
fishermen (in more distant fishing grounds).  A ready explanation for this non-
cooperative attitude lies in the fact that a large majority of bottom-set net 
operators are indebted to fishmerchants with whom they have exclusive sale 
relationships.  Revealingly, the same phenomenon obtains in Saint-Louis.  In the 
latter fishing site as well as in Hann, pervasive sales-tying agreements also 
characterise relations between simple line fishermen and fishmerchants, which 
may again account for the absence of regulation for this fishing technique 
contrary to Kayar where the phenomenon is less widespread. 
Lastly, the most dynamic among line fishermen –those who declare that 
they are going farther into the sea to catch valuable species– have a strong 
proclivity to support effort regulation presumably because their expected gains 
are larger owing to the high value of the species targetted. 
Many of the above results actually point to the importance of homogeneity 
of users as a condition for successful collective action.  The fact that regulatory 
schemes are devised on the basis of a particular fishing technique –with 
regulating methods varying between line fishing and purse seining– shows that 
fishermen try to reduce heterogeneity whenever possible.  Yet, some dimensions 
of user heterogeneity are not easily reducible, namely the presence of fishing 
canoes with ice boxes, the pervasive existence of fishermen-fishmerchants 
exclusive links for some techniques, the co-existence of different ethnic 
communities using the same harvesting technique and targetting the same 
species, the availability of alternative income opportunities for some fishermen 
but not for others. 
 
4.4  As one can judge from the above conclusions, our study has to a large 
extent succeeded in explaining variations in both the incidence and continuity of 
effort-limiting schemes in communities of Senegalese small-scale fishermen.  It 
is noteworthy that many of the factors shown to have a significant impact are of 
a rather structural character, namely, market conditions, features of fishing 
techniques which bear upon enforcement costs of a collective scheme, nature of 
relationships between fishermen and fishmerchants, and history-determined 
patterns of authority and leadership.  By overlooking such critical parameters, 
one incurs a high risk of setting up effort control measures that will be short-
lived.  Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the same parameters are 
susceptible of evolving and, as a result, measures that worked rather well in a 
given period may prove difficult to sustain in a different set of circumstances.  
This dynamic aspect of reality, as we could realise in the course of field   47
interviews, is probably the most difficult to accept by leaders who have played a 
major role in the initiation and enforcement of local-level regulation of fishing 
effort.   
On the other hand, policy aspects do also matter.  Ill-conceived regulation 
mechanisms can obviously impair their viability and effectiveness.  This is 
illustrated in our study by the rotation scheme for purse seines in Saint-Louis 
which has given rise to serious incentive problems owing to its ignoring 
important income-smoothing considerations.   
Bearing in mind that effort-limiting schemes have run into difficulties in 
Saint-Louis and Yoff and that they have not been started in Hann and 
Soumbedioune, it appears that most of the conditions recalled above must be 
simultaneously satisfied for decentralised schemes of effort regulation to 
succeed.  The market structure must be such that fishermen can influence 
prices  ; monitoring costs as determined both by technological or marketing 
conditions and by the design mechanism adopted must not be too high ; most 
fishermen should be free of exclusive relationships with fishmerchants acting as 
credit-givers ; good leaders should be available ; heterogeneity of resource users 
must not be too high (hence the need to devise technique-specific schemes).  
Note that the first of these conditions must be fulfilled only if effort regulation is 
motivated by market power rather than by resource management considerations, 
as has been shown to be the case among Senegalese coastal fishermen. 
 
4.5  Support for decentralised measures of effort regulation does not vary 
between asset owners and crew labourers.  This is not surprising given that the 
share system of payment used in the fishing sector makes crew labourers equally 
interested in getting better prices.  By contrast, crew labourers are opposed to 
marketing organisations run by fishermen presumably because under the same 
system of payment there would be ample scope for uncontrollable cheating 
(mainly through underreporting of true values of sale proceeds) by asset owners. 
 
4.6  Relying on regulatory schemes aimed at increasing fish prices in order to 
gradually build up awareness about resource conservation may prove deceptive.  
Indeed, market conditions may not be suitable for a cartel operation and, as a 
result, price may fail to increase following control of fishing effort.  Fishermen 
may then be discouraged and drop out of the scheme before they come to 
understand the need to manage the resource for conservation purposes.   
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